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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 12:58:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89777 — vfio/pci: clear vdev-&gt;msi_perm after freeing it on init failure</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89777</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vfio/pci: clear vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm after freeing it on init failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vfio_msi_cap_len() lazily allocates the per-device MSI permission table:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm = kmalloc_obj(struct perm_bits, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
	if (!vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm)
		return -ENOMEM;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ret = init_pci_cap_msi_perm(vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm, len, flags);
	if (ret) {
		kfree(vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm);
		return ret;		/* vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm left dangling */
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When init_pci_cap_msi_perm() -&amp;gt; alloc_perm_bits() fails with -ENOMEM, the
error path frees vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm but leaves the freed pointer stored in
it. vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm is not re-zeroed later because struct
vfio_pci_core_device is per-device and persists across open/close cycles,
and the vfio_config_init() error path returns without calling
vfio_config_free(). So the dangling pointer outlives the failed open.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That leads to two use-after-frees on the same device:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Reuse. The next vfio_config_init() sees the stale pointer at
   &amp;#34;if (vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm) return len;&amp;#34; and reuses the freed object. MSI
   config accesses in vfio_pci_config_rw_single() then dereference and
   call the freed perm-&amp;gt;readfn / perm-&amp;gt;writefn function pointers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Double free. A later vfio_config_free() runs free_perm_bits() and
   kfree() on the already-freed object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix it by NULLing vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm after the kfree(), matching the
NULL-after-free discipline already used in free_perm_bits() and
vfio_config_free().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vfio/pci: clear vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm after freeing it on init failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vfio_msi_cap_len() lazily allocates the per-device MSI permission table:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm = kmalloc_obj(struct perm_bits, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
	if (!vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm)
		return -ENOMEM;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ret = init_pci_cap_msi_perm(vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm, len, flags);
	if (ret) {
		kfree(vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm);
		return ret;		/* vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm left dangling */
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When init_pci_cap_msi_perm() -&amp;gt; alloc_perm_bits() fails with -ENOMEM, the
error path frees vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm but leaves the freed pointer stored in
it. vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm is not re-zeroed later because struct
vfio_pci_core_device is per-device and persists across open/close cycles,
and the vfio_config_init() error path returns without calling
vfio_config_free(). So the dangling pointer outlives the failed open.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That leads to two use-after-frees on the same device:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Reuse. The next vfio_config_init() sees the stale pointer at
   &amp;#34;if (vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm) return len;&amp;#34; and reuses the freed object. MSI
   config accesses in vfio_pci_config_rw_single() then dereference and
   call the freed perm-&amp;gt;readfn / perm-&amp;gt;writefn function pointers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Double free. A later vfio_config_free() runs free_perm_bits() and
   kfree() on the already-freed object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix it by NULLing vdev-&amp;gt;msi_perm after the kfree(), matching the
NULL-after-free discipline already used in free_perm_bits() and
vfio_config_free().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89777</guid>
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