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BELL-CVE-2026-98169

Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

fkie_cve-2026-98169

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()

If snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE, smb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length of the server's reply.

Because SMB2_ioctl() places no lower bound on the server-supplied OutputCount and allocates retbuf to exactly that length, a short reply results in ret_data_len exceeding the size of retbuf. The subsequent copy_to_user() then reads past the end of retbuf, leaking adjacent slab memory to userspace. The subsequent clamp check is ineffective as it only reduces ret_data_len.

Fix this by rejecting replies shorter than sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) with -EIO. Note that the bound is set to the 12-byte struct size rather than the 16-byte MIN_SNAPSHOT_ARRAY_SIZE defined in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.15.1, because 12 bytes is exactly what copy_to_user() attempts to read.

GHSA-2c6m-5vjc-xqc6

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()

If snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE, smb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length of the server's reply.

msrc_CVE-2026-98169 — smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()

msrc_CVE-2026-98169

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98169

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 236 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots() If snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE, smb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length of the server's reply. Because SMB2_ioctl() places no lower bound on the server-supplied OutputCount and allocates retbuf to exactly that length, a short reply results in ret_data_len exceeding the size of retbuf. The subsequent copy_to_user() then reads past the end of retbuf, leaking adjacent slab memory to userspace. The subsequent clamp check is ineffective as it only reduces ret_data_len. Fix this by rejecting replies shorter than sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) with -EIO. Note that the bound is set to the 12-byte struct size rather than the 16-byte MIN_SNAPSHOT_ARRAY_SIZE defined in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.15.1, because 12 bytes is exactly what copy_to_user() attempts to read.