https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 18:12:44 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-92487 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-92487 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-92487 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping</p> <p>When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be overwritten.</p> <p>Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop -&gt;map_pages so that every first write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a writable PTE, skip -&gt;page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves never-written pages in a large mapping alone.</p> <p>The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping. On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers it.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping</p> <p>When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be overwritten.</p> <p>Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop -&gt;map_pages so that every first write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a writable PTE, skip -&gt;page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves never-written pages in a large mapping alone.</p> <p>The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping. On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers it.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-92487 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5qr9-x6vc-9rx2 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping</p> <p>When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be overwritten.</p> <p>Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop -&gt;map_pages so that every first write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a writable PTE, skip -&gt;page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves never-written pages in a large mapping alone.</p> <p>The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping. On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers it.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping</p> <p>When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be overwritten.</p> <p>Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop -&gt;map_pages so that every first write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a writable PTE, skip -&gt;page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves never-written pages in a large mapping alone.</p> <p>The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping. On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers it.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5qr9-x6vc-9rx2 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1 <p>kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-92487 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 96 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be overwritten. Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop -&gt;map_pages so that every first write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a writable PTE, skip -&gt;page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves never-written pages in a large mapping alone. The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping. On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers it.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 96 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be overwritten. Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop -&gt;map_pages so that every first write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a writable PTE, skip -&gt;page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves never-written pages in a large mapping alone. The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping. On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers it.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-92487