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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:20:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90321</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90321</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90321</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patch series &amp;#34;ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds&amp;#34;, v7.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr
metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk
out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch (of 2):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk
metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in
operation-specific consumers.  The existing ibody lookup helper validates
inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does
not reject entry name/value bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation
for inline xattrs.  Keep the operation paths on their existing
header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the
inode block is validated at read time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or
listxattr() can walk past the inline storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529
Call Trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
  print_report+0xce/0x630
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
  ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
  ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820
  ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0
  __vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130
  vf…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patch series &amp;#34;ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds&amp;#34;, v7.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr
metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk
out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch (of 2):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk
metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in
operation-specific consumers.  The existing ibody lookup helper validates
inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does
not reject entry name/value bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation
for inline xattrs.  Keep the operation paths on their existing
header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the
inode block is validated at read time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or
listxattr() can walk past the inline storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529
Call Trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
  print_report+0xce/0x630
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
  ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
  ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820
  ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0
  __vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130
  vf…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90321</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wp5h-rffw-rh8w</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wp5h-rffw-rh8w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patch series &amp;#34;ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds&amp;#34;, v7.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr
metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk
out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch (of 2):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk
metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in
operation-specific consumers.  The existing ibody lookup helper validates
inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does
not reject entry name/value bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation
for inline xattrs.  Keep the operation paths on their existing
header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the
inode block is validated at read time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or
listxattr() can walk past the inline storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529
Call Trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
  print_report+0xce/0x630
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
  ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
  ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820
  ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0
  __vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130
  vf…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patch series &amp;#34;ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds&amp;#34;, v7.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr
metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk
out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch (of 2):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk
metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in
operation-specific consumers.  The existing ibody lookup helper validates
inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does
not reject entry name/value bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation
for inline xattrs.  Keep the operation paths on their existing
header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the
inode block is validated at read time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or
listxattr() can walk past the inline storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529
Call Trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
  print_report+0xce/0x630
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
  ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
  ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820
  ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0
  __vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130
  vf…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wp5h-rffw-rh8w</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-90321 — ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90321</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-90321</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90321</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90321</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation Patch series &amp;#34;ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds&amp;#34;, v7. This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata. This patch (of 2): ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in operation-specific consumers.  The existing ibody lookup helper validates inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does not reject entry name/value bounds. Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation for inline xattrs.  Keep the operation paths on their existing header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the inode block is validated at read time. Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or listxattr() can walk past the inline storage. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529 Call Trace:   dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0   print_report+0xce/0x630   kasan_report+0xe0/0x110   ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170   ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820   ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0   __vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130   vfs_getxatt…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation Patch series &amp;#34;ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds&amp;#34;, v7. This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata. This patch (of 2): ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in operation-specific consumers.  The existing ibody lookup helper validates inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does not reject entry name/value bounds. Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation for inline xattrs.  Keep the operation paths on their existing header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the inode block is validated at read time. Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or listxattr() can walk past the inline storage. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529 Call Trace:   dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0   print_report+0xce/0x630   kasan_report+0xe0/0x110   ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170   ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820   ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0   __vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130   vfs_getxatt…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90321</guid>
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