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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 05:29:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90015</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90015</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90015</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90015</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90015</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the
endpoint&amp;#39;s wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail
through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB.
xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers,
copies the data back into the URB&amp;#39;s buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg,
under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments.
That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more
segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them.
Only the last one survives in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce
buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length
and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize
sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous
contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was
found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity
target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather
than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so
wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash
block. verity_pr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the
endpoint&amp;#39;s wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail
through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB.
xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers,
copies the data back into the URB&amp;#39;s buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg,
under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments.
That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more
segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them.
Only the last one survives in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce
buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length
and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize
sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous
contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was
found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity
target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather
than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so
wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash
block. verity_pr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90015</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vp4r-2v9h-p25v</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vp4r-2v9h-p25v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the
endpoint&amp;#39;s wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail
through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB.
xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers,
copies the data back into the URB&amp;#39;s buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg,
under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments.
That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more
segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them.
Only the last one survives in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce
buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length
and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize
sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous
contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was
found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity
target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather
than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so
wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash
block. verity_pr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the
endpoint&amp;#39;s wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail
through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB.
xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers,
copies the data back into the URB&amp;#39;s buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg,
under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments.
That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more
segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them.
Only the last one survives in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce
buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length
and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize
sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous
contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was
found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity
target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather
than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so
wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash
block. verity_pr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vp4r-2v9h-p25v</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-90015 — xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90015</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-90015</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90015</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90015</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90015</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 239 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the endpoint&amp;#39;s wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB. xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers, copies the data back into the URB&amp;#39;s buffer. The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg, under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments. That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them. Only the last one survives in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped. The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce. Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash block. verity_prefetc…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 239 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the endpoint&amp;#39;s wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB. xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers, copies the data back into the URB&amp;#39;s buffer. The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg, under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments. That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them. Only the last one survives in td-&amp;gt;bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped. The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce. Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash block. verity_prefetc…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90015</guid>
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