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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 02:39:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-89600</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89600</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89600</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-89600</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89600</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fanotify: fix use-after-free of file range info&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fsnotify_pre_content() builds its file_range on the triggering task&amp;#39;s
stack. fanotify_alloc_perm_event() saves a pointer to range.pos in the
heap-allocated permission event so copy_range_info_to_user() can report
the offset later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The event reader can set the event state to FAN_EVENT_REPORTED and then
sleep while preparing the file descriptor. If a signal interrupts the
triggering task at that point, fanotify_get_response() changes the state
to FAN_EVENT_CANCELED and returns. This unwinds the file_range stack
frame while the reader still owns the event. The reader then dereferences
pevent-&amp;gt;ppos and copies the stale stack value to userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KASAN reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811434fc50 by task fanotify_inotif/95
  Call Trace:
   fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970
   vfs_read+0x177/0xa20
   ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0
   do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Store the range position directly in the permission event and use
FANOTIFY_NO_RANGE when range information is unavailable. The event remains
alive until the reader finishes, so the reported offset no longer depends
on the triggering task&amp;#39;s stack.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fanotify: fix use-after-free of file range info&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fsnotify_pre_content() builds its file_range on the triggering task&amp;#39;s
stack. fanotify_alloc_perm_event() saves a pointer to range.pos in the
heap-allocated permission event so copy_range_info_to_user() can report
the offset later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The event reader can set the event state to FAN_EVENT_REPORTED and then
sleep while preparing the file descriptor. If a signal interrupts the
triggering task at that point, fanotify_get_response() changes the state
to FAN_EVENT_CANCELED and returns. This unwinds the file_range stack
frame while the reader still owns the event. The reader then dereferences
pevent-&amp;gt;ppos and copies the stale stack value to userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KASAN reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811434fc50 by task fanotify_inotif/95
  Call Trace:
   fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970
   vfs_read+0x177/0xa20
   ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0
   do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Store the range position directly in the permission event and use
FANOTIFY_NO_RANGE when range information is unavailable. The event remains
alive until the reader finishes, so the reported offset no longer depends
on the triggering task&amp;#39;s stack.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-89600</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hfc9-63gq-6mcj</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hfc9-63gq-6mcj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fanotify: fix use-after-free of file range info&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fsnotify_pre_content() builds its file_range on the triggering task&amp;#39;s
stack. fanotify_alloc_perm_event() saves a pointer to range.pos in the
heap-allocated permission event so copy_range_info_to_user() can report
the offset later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The event reader can set the event state to FAN_EVENT_REPORTED and then
sleep while preparing the file descriptor. If a signal interrupts the
triggering task at that point, fanotify_get_response() changes the state
to FAN_EVENT_CANCELED and returns. This unwinds the file_range stack
frame while the reader still owns the event. The reader then dereferences
pevent-&amp;gt;ppos and copies the stale stack value to userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KASAN reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811434fc50 by task fanotify_inotif/95
  Call Trace:
   fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970
   vfs_read+0x177/0xa20
   ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0
   do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Store the range position directly in the permission event and use
FANOTIFY_NO_RANGE when range information is unavailable. The event remains
alive until the reader finishes, so the reported offset no longer depends
on the triggering task&amp;#39;s stack.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fanotify: fix use-after-free of file range info&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fsnotify_pre_content() builds its file_range on the triggering task&amp;#39;s
stack. fanotify_alloc_perm_event() saves a pointer to range.pos in the
heap-allocated permission event so copy_range_info_to_user() can report
the offset later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The event reader can set the event state to FAN_EVENT_REPORTED and then
sleep while preparing the file descriptor. If a signal interrupts the
triggering task at that point, fanotify_get_response() changes the state
to FAN_EVENT_CANCELED and returns. This unwinds the file_range stack
frame while the reader still owns the event. The reader then dereferences
pevent-&amp;gt;ppos and copies the stale stack value to userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KASAN reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811434fc50 by task fanotify_inotif/95
  Call Trace:
   fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970
   vfs_read+0x177/0xa20
   ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0
   do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Store the range position directly in the permission event and use
FANOTIFY_NO_RANGE when range information is unavailable. The event remains
alive until the reader finishes, so the reported offset no longer depends
on the triggering task&amp;#39;s stack.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hfc9-63gq-6mcj</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-89600</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89600</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fanotify: fix use-after-free of file range info fsnotify_pre_content() builds its file_range on the triggering task&amp;#39;s stack. fanotify_alloc_perm_event() saves a pointer to range.pos in the heap-allocated permission event so copy_range_info_to_user() can report the offset later. The event reader can set the event state to FAN_EVENT_REPORTED and then sleep while preparing the file descriptor. If a signal interrupts the triggering task at that point, fanotify_get_response() changes the state to FAN_EVENT_CANCELED and returns. This unwinds the file_range stack frame while the reader still owns the event. The reader then dereferences pevent-&amp;gt;ppos and copies the stale stack value to userspace. KASAN reported:   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970   Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811434fc50 by task fanotify_inotif/95   Call Trace:    fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970    vfs_read+0x177/0xa20    ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0    do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Store the range position directly in the permission event and use FANOTIFY_NO_RANGE when range information is unavailable. The event remains alive until the reader finishes, so the reported offset no longer depends on the triggering task&amp;#39;s stack.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fanotify: fix use-after-free of file range info fsnotify_pre_content() builds its file_range on the triggering task&amp;#39;s stack. fanotify_alloc_perm_event() saves a pointer to range.pos in the heap-allocated permission event so copy_range_info_to_user() can report the offset later. The event reader can set the event state to FAN_EVENT_REPORTED and then sleep while preparing the file descriptor. If a signal interrupts the triggering task at that point, fanotify_get_response() changes the state to FAN_EVENT_CANCELED and returns. This unwinds the file_range stack frame while the reader still owns the event. The reader then dereferences pevent-&amp;gt;ppos and copies the stale stack value to userspace. KASAN reported:   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970   Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811434fc50 by task fanotify_inotif/95   Call Trace:    fanotify_read+0x293e/0x2970    vfs_read+0x177/0xa20    ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0    do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Store the range position directly in the permission event and use FANOTIFY_NO_RANGE when range information is unavailable. The event remains alive until the reader finishes, so the reported offset no longer depends on the triggering task&amp;#39;s stack.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89600</guid>
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