https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:29:40 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86043 <p>Skipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to version 0.27.37, the opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody filter can authorize an oversized request after Skipper truncates the body presented to Open Policy Agent because the input.truncated_body signal is derived from Content-Length rather than the actual read result. In filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go, ExtractHttpBodyOptionally truncates bodies at maxBodyBytes, while filters/openpolicyagent/internal/envoy/skipperadapter.go copies the request headers without adding a Content-Length value that reflects the truncation. For an HTTP/1.1 request using Transfer-Encoding: chunked or an HTTP/2 request without Content-Length, a body-inspecting policy that follows the prior mitigation and permits input.truncated_body equal to false can evaluate only the truncated prefix, allow the request, and then forward the full oversized body to the protected upstream. This residual issue is distinct from CVE-2026-50197. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.37.</p> <p>Skipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to version 0.27.37, the opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody filter can authorize an oversized request after Skipper truncates the body presented to Open Policy Agent because the input.truncated_body signal is derived from Content-Length rather than the actual read result. In filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go, ExtractHttpBodyOptionally truncates bodies at maxBodyBytes, while filters/openpolicyagent/internal/envoy/skipperadapter.go copies the request headers without adding a Content-Length value that reflects the truncation. For an HTTP/1.1 request using Transfer-Encoding: chunked or an HTTP/2 request without Content-Length, a body-inspecting policy that follows the prior mitigation and permits input.truncated_body equal to false can evaluate only the truncated prefix, allow the request, and then forward the full oversized body to the protected upstream. This residual issue is distinct from CVE-2026-50197. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.37.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86043 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5gpm-rgj3-9q76 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/zalando/skipper</p> <p>- **Affected component:** `filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go` → `ExtractHttpBodyOptionally`; combined with `github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin` `envoyauth/request.go` → `getParsedBody` / `checkIfHTTPBodyTruncated`. Filter: `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody`. - **Affected versions:** `&lt;= 0.27.33` (current HEAD `e7d7014c`). The `truncated_body` mitigation was introduced/recommended in v0.27.26 (advisory GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734) and remains bypassable. - **Fix chain being audited:** CVE-2026-50197 (GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf, commit `3152f3b0`) → GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734 (docs + code, commit `1be950cd` #4126, v0.27.26). This finding is the third, still-open variant.</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>Skipper&#39;s `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` filter authorizes requests by handing the (bounded) request body to Open Policy Agent. When a body exceeds `-open-policy-agent-max-request-body-size` (default 1 MB), Skipper truncates it before OPA sees it. Advisory **GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734** established that deny-on-presence / body-inspecting policies fail OPEN on oversized bodies, and its remediation instructs policy authors to **guard on `input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body`** (implemented as the top-level `input.truncated_body`):</p> <p>```rego default allow := false allow if { input.truncated_body == false # ... body-based conditions } ```</p> <p>That mitigation is itself incomplete. The `truncated_body` flag is computed by the OPA envoy plugin **only when a `content-length` header is present**. A request se…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/zalando/skipper</p> <p>- **Affected component:** `filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go` → `ExtractHttpBodyOptionally`; combined with `github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin` `envoyauth/request.go` → `getParsedBody` / `checkIfHTTPBodyTruncated`. Filter: `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody`. - **Affected versions:** `&lt;= 0.27.33` (current HEAD `e7d7014c`). The `truncated_body` mitigation was introduced/recommended in v0.27.26 (advisory GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734) and remains bypassable. - **Fix chain being audited:** CVE-2026-50197 (GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf, commit `3152f3b0`) → GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734 (docs + code, commit `1be950cd` #4126, v0.27.26). This finding is the third, still-open variant.</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>Skipper&#39;s `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` filter authorizes requests by handing the (bounded) request body to Open Policy Agent. When a body exceeds `-open-policy-agent-max-request-body-size` (default 1 MB), Skipper truncates it before OPA sees it. Advisory **GHSA-8qqm-fp2q-v734** established that deny-on-presence / body-inspecting policies fail OPEN on oversized bodies, and its remediation instructs policy authors to **guard on `input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body`** (implemented as the top-level `input.truncated_body`):</p> <p>```rego default allow := false allow if { input.truncated_body == false # ... body-based conditions } ```</p> <p>That mitigation is itself incomplete. The `truncated_body` flag is computed by the OPA envoy plugin **only when a `content-length` header is present**. A request se…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5gpm-rgj3-9q76