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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-85058</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85058</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, PostOffice.publishWill publishes a client-controlled Last Will message through publish2Subscribers without invoking the authorizator.canWrite check used by normal PUBLISH paths. When anonymous access is enabled and topic ACLs restrict writes, a remote client can set an ACL-protected topic as the Last Will Topic during CONNECT and perform an abnormal client disconnect, causing the broker to inject attacker-controlled messages into a topic for which the client lacks write permission. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, PostOffice.publishWill publishes a client-controlled Last Will message through publish2Subscribers without invoking the authorizator.canWrite check used by normal PUBLISH paths. When anonymous access is enabled and topic ACLs restrict writes, a remote client can set an ACL-protected topic as the Last Will Topic during CONNECT and perform an abnormal client disconnect, causing the broker to inject attacker-controlled messages into a topic for which the client lacks write permission. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85058</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9jjc-fw8x-fmwx — io.moquette:moquette-broker has a Missing Authorization issue</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9jjc-fw8x-fmwx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.moquette:moquette-broker&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moquette MQTT Broker fails to enforce ACL write permission checks when publishing Will (Last Will and Testament) messages on behalf of disconnected clients. All normal PUBLISH paths (`receivedPublishQos0`, `receivedPublishQos1`, `receivedPublishQos2`) correctly invoke `authorizator.canWrite()` before publishing, but the Will message publishing path (`fireWill()` → `publishWill()` → `publish2Subscribers()`) completely bypasses this authorization check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows an unauthenticated attacker (when `allow_anonymous=true`, which is the default) to inject arbitrary messages into any ACL-protected topic by setting a restricted topic as the Will Topic in the CONNECT packet and then disconnecting abruptly via TCP RST.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Other major MQTT Broker implementations (Mosquitto, EMQX, HiveMQ) correctly enforce ACL checks on Will messages, confirming this is a bug, not a design choice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the MQTT protocol, a client can declare a &amp;#34;Will&amp;#34; topic and message in the CONNECT packet. When the client disconnects abnormally (without sending a DISCONNECT packet), the Broker publishes the Will message on behalf of the client. Although the Will message content (topic and payload) is entirely controlled by the connecting client — making it functionally equivalent to a PUBLISH — Moquette skips the ACL check for this path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File**: `broker/src/main/java/io/moquette/broker/PostOffice.java` (v0.18.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Will publishing path (lines 286-328) — **no canWrite() check**:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.moquette:moquette-broker&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moquette MQTT Broker fails to enforce ACL write permission checks when publishing Will (Last Will and Testament) messages on behalf of disconnected clients. All normal PUBLISH paths (`receivedPublishQos0`, `receivedPublishQos1`, `receivedPublishQos2`) correctly invoke `authorizator.canWrite()` before publishing, but the Will message publishing path (`fireWill()` → `publishWill()` → `publish2Subscribers()`) completely bypasses this authorization check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows an unauthenticated attacker (when `allow_anonymous=true`, which is the default) to inject arbitrary messages into any ACL-protected topic by setting a restricted topic as the Will Topic in the CONNECT packet and then disconnecting abruptly via TCP RST.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Other major MQTT Broker implementations (Mosquitto, EMQX, HiveMQ) correctly enforce ACL checks on Will messages, confirming this is a bug, not a design choice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the MQTT protocol, a client can declare a &amp;#34;Will&amp;#34; topic and message in the CONNECT packet. When the client disconnects abnormally (without sending a DISCONNECT packet), the Broker publishes the Will message on behalf of the client. Although the Will message content (topic and payload) is entirely controlled by the connecting client — making it functionally equivalent to a PUBLISH — Moquette skips the ACL check for this path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File**: `broker/src/main/java/io/moquette/broker/PostOffice.java` (v0.18.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Will publishing path (lines 286-328) — **no canWrite() check**:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9jjc-fw8x-fmwx</guid>
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