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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-82982</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82982</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Approval app&amp;#39;s approve/reject endpoint is meant to require the file&amp;#39;s current etag as a freshness check, preventing an approver from approving or rejecting a file whose contents changed after they reviewed it. The backend only enforced this check when the etag parameter was present and non-empty in the request. An attacker able to intercept and modify the approval request could omit the etag field entirely, bypassing the freshness check and approving or rejecting a file version they never reviewed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Approval app&amp;#39;s approve/reject endpoint is meant to require the file&amp;#39;s current etag as a freshness check, preventing an approver from approving or rejecting a file whose contents changed after they reviewed it. The backend only enforced this check when the etag parameter was present and non-empty in the request. An attacker able to intercept and modify the approval request could omit the etag field entirely, bypassing the freshness check and approving or rejecting a file version they never reviewed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-w4mj-3r4x-wxm3</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w4mj-3r4x-wxm3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Approval app&amp;#39;s approve/reject endpoint is meant to require the file&amp;#39;s current etag as a freshness check, preventing an approver from approving or rejecting a file whose contents changed after they reviewed it. The backend only enforced this check when the etag parameter was present and non-empty in the request. An attacker able to intercept and modify the approval request could omit the etag field entirely, bypassing the freshness check and approving or rejecting a file version they never reviewed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Approval app&amp;#39;s approve/reject endpoint is meant to require the file&amp;#39;s current etag as a freshness check, preventing an approver from approving or rejecting a file whose contents changed after they reviewed it. The backend only enforced this check when the etag parameter was present and non-empty in the request. An attacker able to intercept and modify the approval request could omit the etag field entirely, bypassing the freshness check and approving or rejecting a file version they never reviewed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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