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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 06:39:40 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-81001</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-81001</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-81001</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-81001</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81001</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on
them.  sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under
rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which
sl_setup() installs as dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately
runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting
for the device refcount to drop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */
	list_replace_init(&amp;amp;net_todo_list, &amp;amp;list);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__rtnl_unlock();
	...
		if (dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor)
			dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor(dev);	/* slip_devs[i] = NULL */
		if (dev-&amp;gt;needs_free_netdev)
			free_netdev(dev);
		...
		/* Free network device */
		kobject_put(&amp;amp;dev-&amp;gt;dev.kobj);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at
all.  sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published
and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and
released the device:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 (slip_open)                 CPU1 (slip_close)
                                   unregister_netdev()
                                     rtnl_unlock()
                                       netdev_run_todo()
                                         __rtnl_unlock()
  rtnl_lock()
  sl_sync()
    dev = slip_devs[i]
                                         priv_destructor(dev)…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on
them.  sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under
rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which
sl_setup() installs as dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately
runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting
for the device refcount to drop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */
	list_replace_init(&amp;amp;net_todo_list, &amp;amp;list);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__rtnl_unlock();
	...
		if (dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor)
			dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor(dev);	/* slip_devs[i] = NULL */
		if (dev-&amp;gt;needs_free_netdev)
			free_netdev(dev);
		...
		/* Free network device */
		kobject_put(&amp;amp;dev-&amp;gt;dev.kobj);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at
all.  sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published
and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and
released the device:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 (slip_open)                 CPU1 (slip_close)
                                   unregister_netdev()
                                     rtnl_unlock()
                                       netdev_run_todo()
                                         __rtnl_unlock()
  rtnl_lock()
  sl_sync()
    dev = slip_devs[i]
                                         priv_destructor(dev)…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81001</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pxg4-rg6h-vm8p</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pxg4-rg6h-vm8p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on
them.  sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under
rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which
sl_setup() installs as dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately
runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting
for the device refcount to drop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */
	list_replace_init(&amp;amp;net_todo_list, &amp;amp;list);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__rtnl_unlock();
	...
		if (dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor)
			dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor(dev);	/* slip_devs[i] = NULL */
		if (dev-&amp;gt;needs_free_netdev)
			free_netdev(dev);
		...
		/* Free network device */
		kobject_put(&amp;amp;dev-&amp;gt;dev.kobj);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at
all.  sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published
and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and
released the device:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 (slip_open)                 CPU1 (slip_close)
                                   unregister_netdev()
                                     rtnl_unlock()
                                       netdev_run_todo()
                                         __rtnl_unlock()
  rtnl_lock()
  sl_sync()
    dev = slip_devs[i]
                                         priv_destructor(dev)…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on
them.  sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under
rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which
sl_setup() installs as dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately
runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting
for the device refcount to drop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */
	list_replace_init(&amp;amp;net_todo_list, &amp;amp;list);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__rtnl_unlock();
	...
		if (dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor)
			dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor(dev);	/* slip_devs[i] = NULL */
		if (dev-&amp;gt;needs_free_netdev)
			free_netdev(dev);
		...
		/* Free network device */
		kobject_put(&amp;amp;dev-&amp;gt;dev.kobj);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at
all.  sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published
and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and
released the device:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 (slip_open)                 CPU1 (slip_close)
                                   unregister_netdev()
                                     rtnl_unlock()
                                       netdev_run_todo()
                                         __rtnl_unlock()
  rtnl_lock()
  sl_sync()
    dev = slip_devs[i]
                                         priv_destructor(dev)…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pxg4-rg6h-vm8p</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-81001</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-81001</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync() slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on them.  sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which sl_setup() installs as dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor. priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting for the device refcount to drop: 	/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */ 	list_replace_init(&amp;amp;net_todo_list, &amp;amp;list); 	__rtnl_unlock(); 	... 		if (dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor) 			dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor(dev);	/* slip_devs[i] = NULL */ 		if (dev-&amp;gt;needs_free_netdev) 			free_netdev(dev); 		... 		/* Free network device */ 		kobject_put(&amp;amp;dev-&amp;gt;dev.kobj); So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at all.  sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and released the device:   CPU0 (slip_open)                 CPU1 (slip_close)                                    unregister_netdev()                                      rtnl_unlock()                                        netdev_run_todo()                                          __rtnl_unlock()   rtnl_lock()   sl_sync()     dev = slip_devs[i]                                          priv_destructor(dev)…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync() slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on them.  sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which sl_setup() installs as dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor. priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting for the device refcount to drop: 	/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */ 	list_replace_init(&amp;amp;net_todo_list, &amp;amp;list); 	__rtnl_unlock(); 	... 		if (dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor) 			dev-&amp;gt;priv_destructor(dev);	/* slip_devs[i] = NULL */ 		if (dev-&amp;gt;needs_free_netdev) 			free_netdev(dev); 		... 		/* Free network device */ 		kobject_put(&amp;amp;dev-&amp;gt;dev.kobj); So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at all.  sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and released the device:   CPU0 (slip_open)                 CPU1 (slip_close)                                    unregister_netdev()                                      rtnl_unlock()                                        netdev_run_todo()                                          __rtnl_unlock()   rtnl_lock()   sl_sync()     dev = slip_devs[i]                                          priv_destructor(dev)…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-81001</guid>
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