https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 05:12:29 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77999 <p>Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Unauthenticated PayPal callback forgery leading to order confirmation fraud in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - The PayPal IPN listener&#39;s signature check (`_validateIPN()`) accepted `UNVERIFIED` and any non-`INVALID` response as valid, made its verification request with `CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER` disabled, and stored its verdict in a field nothing downstream ever checked — so processing continued regardless of the outcome. Separately, the paid-amount comparison only ran when `mc_gross` was a positive number; omitting the field from the POST body (`floatval(null) == 0`) skipped the check entirely. Combined with a merchant-configured `receiver_email` and a sequential, enumerable order id read from the `custom` field, an anonymous POST was enough to move a pending order straight to `CONFIRMED` with no payment, or force another customer&#39;s pending order to `FAILED`. `paypalv2.php` performed no amount check under any circumstances.</p> <p>Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Unauthenticated PayPal callback forgery leading to order confirmation fraud in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - The PayPal IPN listener&#39;s signature check (`_validateIPN()`) accepted `UNVERIFIED` and any non-`INVALID` response as valid, made its verification request with `CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER` disabled, and stored its verdict in a field nothing downstream ever checked — so processing continued regardless of the outcome. Separately, the paid-amount comparison only ran when `mc_gross` was a positive number; omitting the field from the POST body (`floatval(null) == 0`) skipped the check entirely. Combined with a merchant-configured `receiver_email` and a sequential, enumerable order id read from the `custom` field, an anonymous POST was enough to move a pending order straight to `CONFIRMED` with no payment, or force another customer&#39;s pending order to `FAILED`. `paypalv2.php` performed no amount check under any circumstances.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77999 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-ffqf-m6vh-866w <p>Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Unauthenticated PayPal callback forgery leading to order confirmation fraud in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - The PayPal IPN listener&#39;s signature check (`_validateIPN()`) accepted `UNVERIFIED` and any non-`INVALID` response as valid, made its verification request with `CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER` disabled, and stored its verdict in a field nothing downstream ever checked — so processing continued regardless of the outcome. Separately, the paid-amount comparison only ran when `mc_gross` was a positive number; omitting the field from the POST body (`floatval(null) == 0`) skipped the check entirely. Combined with a merchant-configured `receiver_email` and a sequential, enumerable order id read from the `custom` field, an anonymous POST was enough to move a pending order straight to `CONFIRMED` with no payment, or force another customer&#39;s pending order to `FAILED`. `paypalv2.php` performed no amount check under any circumstances.</p> <p>Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Unauthenticated PayPal callback forgery leading to order confirmation fraud in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - The PayPal IPN listener&#39;s signature check (`_validateIPN()`) accepted `UNVERIFIED` and any non-`INVALID` response as valid, made its verification request with `CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER` disabled, and stored its verdict in a field nothing downstream ever checked — so processing continued regardless of the outcome. Separately, the paid-amount comparison only ran when `mc_gross` was a positive number; omitting the field from the POST body (`floatval(null) == 0`) skipped the check entirely. Combined with a merchant-configured `receiver_email` and a sequential, enumerable order id read from the `custom` field, an anonymous POST was enough to move a pending order straight to `CONFIRMED` with no payment, or force another customer&#39;s pending order to `FAILED`. `paypalv2.php` performed no amount check under any circumstances.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-ffqf-m6vh-866w