<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 21:48:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-77998</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77998</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO &amp;lt; 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS &amp;lt; 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps &amp;lt; 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP&amp;#39;s openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO &amp;lt; 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS &amp;lt; 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps &amp;lt; 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP&amp;#39;s openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77998</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mp5v-46h8-gw29</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mp5v-46h8-gw29</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO &amp;lt; 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS &amp;lt; 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps &amp;lt; 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP&amp;#39;s openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO &amp;lt; 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS &amp;lt; 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps &amp;lt; 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP&amp;#39;s openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mp5v-46h8-gw29</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
