<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:31:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-77251</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77251</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, Jira search accepts a forbidden project clause because it checks only for the presence of project syntax, Confluence search uses an incomplete case-sensitive space check, and Jira board APIs omit project-filter enforcement. These paths expose issues, boards, or pages outside JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER or CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER when the operator credentials have broader access. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through jira_search, confluence_search, get_board_issues, get_agile_boards, JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER, and CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, Jira search accepts a forbidden project clause because it checks only for the presence of project syntax, Confluence search uses an incomplete case-sensitive space check, and Jira board APIs omit project-filter enforcement. These paths expose issues, boards, or pages outside JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER or CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER when the operator credentials have broader access. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through jira_search, confluence_search, get_board_issues, get_agile_boards, JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER, and CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77251</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w66g-j6c4-hcfc — MCP Atlassian: JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER / CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER allow forbidden-project content exfiltration (one LIVE-p…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w66g-j6c4-hcfc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mcp-atlassian&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`mcp-atlassian` is a popular community MCP server wrapper exposing Jira / Confluence to MCP clients. Operators commonly restrict the surface to a small allowlist of projects/spaces via the `JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER` and `CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER` environment variables, which the README documents as the principal mechanism for limiting attacker-controlled MCP clients (= prompt-injected LLM agents) to the operator&amp;#39;s intended subset of the workspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We identified **three distinct sub-bugs** that let attacker-controlled queries read content from **forbidden** projects/spaces (= projects NOT in the operator&amp;#39;s filter) despite the filter being correctly set. The most severe is **empirically reproduced on production Atlassian Cloud** with real operator credentials and sentinel content in two real projects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Sub-bug | Layer | Class | Live? |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A1** | Jira `jira_search` `jql` | substring-bypass | 🔴 **LIVE PROVEN 2026-05-18 on real Atlassian Cloud** |
| **A2** | Confluence `confluence_search` `cql` | case-sensitive substring-bypass | code-level verified |
| **B** | Jira agile `get_board_issues` / `get_agile_boards` | zero-filter (missing check) | code-level verified |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Sub-bug A1** — `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/search.py` lines 92-94 at HEAD `d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
if projects_filter and &amp;#34;project = &amp;#34; not in jql.lower():
    jql = f&amp;#34;{jql} AND project in ({&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;.join(projects_filter)})&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The substring check is s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mcp-atlassian&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`mcp-atlassian` is a popular community MCP server wrapper exposing Jira / Confluence to MCP clients. Operators commonly restrict the surface to a small allowlist of projects/spaces via the `JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER` and `CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER` environment variables, which the README documents as the principal mechanism for limiting attacker-controlled MCP clients (= prompt-injected LLM agents) to the operator&amp;#39;s intended subset of the workspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We identified **three distinct sub-bugs** that let attacker-controlled queries read content from **forbidden** projects/spaces (= projects NOT in the operator&amp;#39;s filter) despite the filter being correctly set. The most severe is **empirically reproduced on production Atlassian Cloud** with real operator credentials and sentinel content in two real projects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Sub-bug | Layer | Class | Live? |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A1** | Jira `jira_search` `jql` | substring-bypass | 🔴 **LIVE PROVEN 2026-05-18 on real Atlassian Cloud** |
| **A2** | Confluence `confluence_search` `cql` | case-sensitive substring-bypass | code-level verified |
| **B** | Jira agile `get_board_issues` / `get_agile_boards` | zero-filter (missing check) | code-level verified |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Sub-bug A1** — `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/search.py` lines 92-94 at HEAD `d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
if projects_filter and &amp;#34;project = &amp;#34; not in jql.lower():
    jql = f&amp;#34;{jql} AND project in ({&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;.join(projects_filter)})&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The substring check is s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w66g-j6c4-hcfc</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
