https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 18:31:00 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77243 <p>MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, ENABLED_TOOLS and TOOLSETS are applied when tools are listed but are not rechecked when a tools/call request is dispatched. A client that knows a hidden tool name can directly invoke excluded read, write, or delete tools despite the operator&#39;s configured least-privilege restrictions. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through ENABLED_TOOLS, TOOLSETS, tools/list, tools/call, and _call_tool_mcp, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.</p> <p>MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, ENABLED_TOOLS and TOOLSETS are applied when tools are listed but are not rechecked when a tools/call request is dispatched. A client that knows a hidden tool name can directly invoke excluded read, write, or delete tools despite the operator&#39;s configured least-privilege restrictions. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through ENABLED_TOOLS, TOOLSETS, tools/list, tools/call, and _call_tool_mcp, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77243 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3r68-hf9h-887v <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-atlassian</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`ENABLED_TOOLS` and `TOOLSETS` filters are enforced at `tools/list` time only. `tools/call` dispatches from the full unfiltered tool registry (73 tools). Any user with access to the server endpoint that knows a tool name can invoke it directly. Tool names are not secret since mcp-atlassian is open source. Any direct JSON-RPC call bypasses the restriction entirely.</p> <p>`READ_ONLY_MODE` is **not** affected: it has dual enforcement at list time (`_list_tools_mcp`) and call time `@check_write_access decorator`. The developers applied the correct pattern to `READ_ONLY_MODE` but not to `ENABLED_TOOLS` or `toolsets` - confirming this is an implementation oversight.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Any user with access to the MCP server&#39;s HTTP endpoint can invoke any of the 73 registered tools regardless of `ENABLED_TOOLS` or `TOOLSETS` configuration - including write and delete operations on Jira issues, Confluence pages, etc. Operators deploying mcp-atlassian via Streamable HTTP rely on `ENABLED_TOOLS` to enforce least-privilege access; the bypass invalidates that model entirely.</p> <p>The security impact concentrates in multi-user / HTTP-transport deployments, where the tool filter is a trust boundary between clients. In a single-user stdio deployment there is no second principal to defend against.</p> <p>### Details In `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py`, AtlassianMCP overrides `_list_tools_mcp` and applies the `TOOLSETS` and `ENABLED_TOOLS` filters before returning the tool list to clients. The `_c…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-atlassian</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`ENABLED_TOOLS` and `TOOLSETS` filters are enforced at `tools/list` time only. `tools/call` dispatches from the full unfiltered tool registry (73 tools). Any user with access to the server endpoint that knows a tool name can invoke it directly. Tool names are not secret since mcp-atlassian is open source. Any direct JSON-RPC call bypasses the restriction entirely.</p> <p>`READ_ONLY_MODE` is **not** affected: it has dual enforcement at list time (`_list_tools_mcp`) and call time `@check_write_access decorator`. The developers applied the correct pattern to `READ_ONLY_MODE` but not to `ENABLED_TOOLS` or `toolsets` - confirming this is an implementation oversight.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Any user with access to the MCP server&#39;s HTTP endpoint can invoke any of the 73 registered tools regardless of `ENABLED_TOOLS` or `TOOLSETS` configuration - including write and delete operations on Jira issues, Confluence pages, etc. Operators deploying mcp-atlassian via Streamable HTTP rely on `ENABLED_TOOLS` to enforce least-privilege access; the bypass invalidates that model entirely.</p> <p>The security impact concentrates in multi-user / HTTP-transport deployments, where the tool filter is a trust boundary between clients. In a single-user stdio deployment there is no second principal to defend against.</p> <p>### Details In `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py`, AtlassianMCP overrides `_list_tools_mcp` and applies the `TOOLSETS` and `ENABLED_TOOLS` filters before returning the tool list to clients. The `_c…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3r68-hf9h-887v https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-4081 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-atlassian</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`ENABLED_TOOLS` and `TOOLSETS` filters are enforced at `tools/list` time only. `tools/call` dispatches from the full unfiltered tool registry (73 tools). Any user with access to the server endpoint that knows a tool name can invoke it directly. Tool names are not secret since mcp-atlassian is open source. Any direct JSON-RPC call bypasses the restriction entirely.</p> <p>`READ_ONLY_MODE` is **not** affected: it has dual enforcement at list time (`_list_tools_mcp`) and call time `@check_write_access decorator`. The developers applied the correct pattern to `READ_ONLY_MODE` but not to `ENABLED_TOOLS` or `toolsets` - confirming this is an implementation oversight.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Any user with access to the MCP server&#39;s HTTP endpoint can invoke any of the 73 registered tools regardless of `ENABLED_TOOLS` or `TOOLSETS` configuration - including write and delete operations on Jira issues, Confluence pages, etc. Operators deploying mcp-atlassian via Streamable HTTP rely on `ENABLED_TOOLS` to enforce least-privilege access; the bypass invalidates that model entirely.</p> <p>The security impact concentrates in multi-user / HTTP-transport deployments, where the tool filter is a trust boundary between clients. In a single-user stdio deployment there is no second principal to defend against.</p> <p>### Details In `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py`, AtlassianMCP overrides `_list_tools_mcp` and applies the `TOOLSETS` and `ENABLED_TOOLS` filters before returning the tool list to clients. The `_c…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-atlassian</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`ENABLED_TOOLS` and `TOOLSETS` filters are enforced at `tools/list` time only. `tools/call` dispatches from the full unfiltered tool registry (73 tools). Any user with access to the server endpoint that knows a tool name can invoke it directly. Tool names are not secret since mcp-atlassian is open source. Any direct JSON-RPC call bypasses the restriction entirely.</p> <p>`READ_ONLY_MODE` is **not** affected: it has dual enforcement at list time (`_list_tools_mcp`) and call time `@check_write_access decorator`. The developers applied the correct pattern to `READ_ONLY_MODE` but not to `ENABLED_TOOLS` or `toolsets` - confirming this is an implementation oversight.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Any user with access to the MCP server&#39;s HTTP endpoint can invoke any of the 73 registered tools regardless of `ENABLED_TOOLS` or `TOOLSETS` configuration - including write and delete operations on Jira issues, Confluence pages, etc. Operators deploying mcp-atlassian via Streamable HTTP rely on `ENABLED_TOOLS` to enforce least-privilege access; the bypass invalidates that model entirely.</p> <p>The security impact concentrates in multi-user / HTTP-transport deployments, where the tool filter is a trust boundary between clients. In a single-user stdio deployment there is no second principal to defend against.</p> <p>### Details In `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py`, AtlassianMCP overrides `_list_tools_mcp` and applies the `TOOLSETS` and `ENABLED_TOOLS` filters before returning the tool list to clients. The `_c…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-4081