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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-75981</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75981</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to and including 3.2.5. The special gettext markers &amp;#39;#!trpst#&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;#!trpen#&amp;#39; are unconditionally rewritten to &amp;#39;&amp;lt;&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; by translate_page() in includes/class-translation-render.php (lines 538-539). Because those markers are plain text with no HTML-special characters, an unauthenticated attacker can embed them in a comment; the markers survive wp_kses, and when the post is viewed in a secondary language the substitution turns the attacker&amp;#39;s &amp;#39;#!trpst#img ... #!trpen#&amp;#39; into a real &amp;lt;img&amp;gt; tag. remove_tags_from_output() only strips &amp;lt;script&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;style&amp;gt;, so an &amp;lt;img onerror=...&amp;gt; executes in the visitor&amp;#39;s browser.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to and including 3.2.5. The special gettext markers &amp;#39;#!trpst#&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;#!trpen#&amp;#39; are unconditionally rewritten to &amp;#39;&amp;lt;&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; by translate_page() in includes/class-translation-render.php (lines 538-539). Because those markers are plain text with no HTML-special characters, an unauthenticated attacker can embed them in a comment; the markers survive wp_kses, and when the post is viewed in a secondary language the substitution turns the attacker&amp;#39;s &amp;#39;#!trpst#img ... #!trpen#&amp;#39; into a real &amp;lt;img&amp;gt; tag. remove_tags_from_output() only strips &amp;lt;script&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;style&amp;gt;, so an &amp;lt;img onerror=...&amp;gt; executes in the visitor&amp;#39;s browser.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75981</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-pvgp-75fv-2h99</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pvgp-75fv-2h99</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to and including 3.2.5. The special gettext markers &amp;#39;#!trpst#&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;#!trpen#&amp;#39; are unconditionally rewritten to &amp;#39;&amp;lt;&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; by translate_page() in includes/class-translation-render.php (lines 538-539). Because those markers are plain text with no HTML-special characters, an unauthenticated attacker can embed them in a comment; the markers survive wp_kses, and when the post is viewed in a secondary language the substitution turns the attacker&amp;#39;s &amp;#39;#!trpst#img ... #!trpen#&amp;#39; into a real &amp;lt;img&amp;gt; tag. remove_tags_from_output() only strips &amp;lt;script&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;style&amp;gt;, so an &amp;lt;img onerror=...&amp;gt; executes in the visitor&amp;#39;s browser.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to and including 3.2.5. The special gettext markers &amp;#39;#!trpst#&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;#!trpen#&amp;#39; are unconditionally rewritten to &amp;#39;&amp;lt;&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; by translate_page() in includes/class-translation-render.php (lines 538-539). Because those markers are plain text with no HTML-special characters, an unauthenticated attacker can embed them in a comment; the markers survive wp_kses, and when the post is viewed in a secondary language the substitution turns the attacker&amp;#39;s &amp;#39;#!trpst#img ... #!trpen#&amp;#39; into a real &amp;lt;img&amp;gt; tag. remove_tags_from_output() only strips &amp;lt;script&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;style&amp;gt;, so an &amp;lt;img onerror=...&amp;gt; executes in the visitor&amp;#39;s browser.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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