https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 11:27:54 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73667 <p>OpenChoreo is a complete, open-source developer platform for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.4, 1.1.4, and 1.2.0-rc.2, OpenChoreo Workflow Plane templates under samples/getting-started/workflow-templates/ interpolated developer-controlled workflow parameters into shell program text executed through sh -c instead of passing the values through container.env, allowing arbitrary commands to run in workflow pods while affected privileged Podman templates lacked hostUsers: false. This issue is fixed in versions 1.0.4, 1.1.4, and 1.2.0-rc.2.</p> <p>OpenChoreo is a complete, open-source developer platform for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.4, 1.1.4, and 1.2.0-rc.2, OpenChoreo Workflow Plane templates under samples/getting-started/workflow-templates/ interpolated developer-controlled workflow parameters into shell program text executed through sh -c instead of passing the values through container.env, allowing arbitrary commands to run in workflow pods while affected privileged Podman templates lacked hostUsers: false. This issue is fixed in versions 1.0.4, 1.1.4, and 1.2.0-rc.2.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73667 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2mw5-23gm-pccq <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo</p> <p>### Summary OpenChoreo Workflow Plane templates were vulnerable to OS command injection because some developer-controlled workflow parameters were interpolated directly into shell program text executed through sh -c.</p> <p>An authenticated user with permission to configure and trigger an affected workflow could supply crafted parameter values containing shell metacharacters. Because Argo substituted these values directly into the shell script before execution, the values could alter the script and execute arbitrary commands inside the workflow pod.</p> <p>In affected configurations, some build and publish templates used privileged Podman containers without Kubernetes pod user-namespace isolation. Consequently, injected commands could run as UID 0 inside a privileged container, with UID 0 mapped into the host user namespace. This substantially increased the potential impact of the command-injection vulnerability.</p> <p>The remediation ensures that workflow parameters are treated as data rather than executable shell syntax. Affected values are now passed through container.env and consumed as quoted shell variables. JSON-derived build environment variables and build arguments are passed as separate argument-vector entries instead of being reconstructed as whitespace-delimited shell strings.</p> <p>### Impact An authenticated user with permission to trigger an affected workflow could execute arbitrary commands inside the corresponding workflow pod.</p> <p>Depending on the affected template and its configur…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo</p> <p>### Summary OpenChoreo Workflow Plane templates were vulnerable to OS command injection because some developer-controlled workflow parameters were interpolated directly into shell program text executed through sh -c.</p> <p>An authenticated user with permission to configure and trigger an affected workflow could supply crafted parameter values containing shell metacharacters. Because Argo substituted these values directly into the shell script before execution, the values could alter the script and execute arbitrary commands inside the workflow pod.</p> <p>In affected configurations, some build and publish templates used privileged Podman containers without Kubernetes pod user-namespace isolation. Consequently, injected commands could run as UID 0 inside a privileged container, with UID 0 mapped into the host user namespace. This substantially increased the potential impact of the command-injection vulnerability.</p> <p>The remediation ensures that workflow parameters are treated as data rather than executable shell syntax. Affected values are now passed through container.env and consumed as quoted shell variables. JSON-derived build environment variables and build arguments are passed as separate argument-vector entries instead of being reconstructed as whitespace-delimited shell strings.</p> <p>### Impact An authenticated user with permission to trigger an affected workflow could execute arbitrary commands inside the corresponding workflow pod.</p> <p>Depending on the affected template and its configur…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2mw5-23gm-pccq