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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 23:14:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64436</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64436</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64436</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0982 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0982</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64436</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64436</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by
allocating x-&amp;gt;calg and copying only the algorithm name:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x-&amp;gt;calg = kmalloc_obj(*x-&amp;gt;calg);
	if (!x-&amp;gt;calg) {
		err = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}
	strcpy(x-&amp;gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_name, a-&amp;gt;name);
	x-&amp;gt;props.calgo = sa-&amp;gt;sadb_sa_encrypt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike the authentication (x-&amp;gt;aalg) and encryption (x-&amp;gt;ealg) branches of
the same function, the compression branch never initializes
calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len.  IPComp carries no key and the allocation only
reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field
is left containing uninitialized slab data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an
IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm_state_migrate()
	  xfrm_state_clone_and_setup()
	    x-&amp;gt;calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig-&amp;gt;calg);
	      kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8.  With
a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the
68-byte calg object.  Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating
it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60
  Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287
  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1
  Call Trace:
   &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by
allocating x-&amp;gt;calg and copying only the algorithm name:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x-&amp;gt;calg = kmalloc_obj(*x-&amp;gt;calg);
	if (!x-&amp;gt;calg) {
		err = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}
	strcpy(x-&amp;gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_name, a-&amp;gt;name);
	x-&amp;gt;props.calgo = sa-&amp;gt;sadb_sa_encrypt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike the authentication (x-&amp;gt;aalg) and encryption (x-&amp;gt;ealg) branches of
the same function, the compression branch never initializes
calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len.  IPComp carries no key and the allocation only
reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field
is left containing uninitialized slab data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an
IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm_state_migrate()
	  xfrm_state_clone_and_setup()
	    x-&amp;gt;calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig-&amp;gt;calg);
	      kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8.  With
a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the
68-byte calg object.  Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating
it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60
  Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287
  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1
  Call Trace:
   &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64436</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rcfx-m5g2-2jgr</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rcfx-m5g2-2jgr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by
allocating x-&amp;gt;calg and copying only the algorithm name:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x-&amp;gt;calg = kmalloc_obj(*x-&amp;gt;calg);
	if (!x-&amp;gt;calg) {
		err = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}
	strcpy(x-&amp;gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_name, a-&amp;gt;name);
	x-&amp;gt;props.calgo = sa-&amp;gt;sadb_sa_encrypt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike the authentication (x-&amp;gt;aalg) and encryption (x-&amp;gt;ealg) branches of
the same function, the compression branch never initializes
calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len.  IPComp carries no key and the allocation only
reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field
is left containing uninitialized slab data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an
IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm_state_migrate()
	  xfrm_state_clone_and_setup()
	    x-&amp;gt;calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig-&amp;gt;calg);
	      kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8.  With
a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the
68-byte calg object.  Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating
it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60
  Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287
  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1
  Call Trace:
   &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by
allocating x-&amp;gt;calg and copying only the algorithm name:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x-&amp;gt;calg = kmalloc_obj(*x-&amp;gt;calg);
	if (!x-&amp;gt;calg) {
		err = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}
	strcpy(x-&amp;gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_name, a-&amp;gt;name);
	x-&amp;gt;props.calgo = sa-&amp;gt;sadb_sa_encrypt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike the authentication (x-&amp;gt;aalg) and encryption (x-&amp;gt;ealg) branches of
the same function, the compression branch never initializes
calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len.  IPComp carries no key and the allocation only
reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field
is left containing uninitialized slab data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an
IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm_state_migrate()
	  xfrm_state_clone_and_setup()
	    x-&amp;gt;calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig-&amp;gt;calg);
	      kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8.  With
a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the
68-byte calg object.  Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating
it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60
  Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287
  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1
  Call Trace:
   &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rcfx-m5g2-2jgr</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-64436 — net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64436</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-64436</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64436</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3532 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-3532</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant &amp;amp;apos;size&amp;amp;apos; argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.(CVE-2022-49289)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parisc: Fix double SIGFPE crash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Camm noticed that on parisc a SIGFPE exception will crash an application with
a second SIGFPE in the signal handler.  Dave analyzed it, and it happens
because glibc uses a double-word floating-point store to atomically update
function descriptors. As a result of lazy binding, we hit a floating-point
store in fpe_func almost immediately.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the T bit is set, an assist exception trap occurs when when the
co-processor encounters *any* floating-point instruction except for a double
store of register %fr0.  The latter cancels all pending traps.  Let&amp;amp;apos;s fix this
by clearing the Trap (T) bit in the FP status register before returning to the
signal handler in userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue can be reproduced with this test program:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;root@parisc:~# cat fpe.c&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void fpe_func(int sig, siginfo_t *i, void *v) {…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant &amp;amp;apos;size&amp;amp;apos; argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.(CVE-2022-49289)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parisc: Fix double SIGFPE crash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Camm noticed that on parisc a SIGFPE exception will crash an application with
a second SIGFPE in the signal handler.  Dave analyzed it, and it happens
because glibc uses a double-word floating-point store to atomically update
function descriptors. As a result of lazy binding, we hit a floating-point
store in fpe_func almost immediately.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the T bit is set, an assist exception trap occurs when when the
co-processor encounters *any* floating-point instruction except for a double
store of register %fr0.  The latter cancels all pending traps.  Let&amp;amp;apos;s fix this
by clearing the Trap (T) bit in the FP status register before returning to the
signal handler in userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue can be reproduced with this test program:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;root@parisc:~# cat fpe.c&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void fpe_func(int sig, siginfo_t *i, void *v) {…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-3532</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64436</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64436</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by allocating x-&amp;gt;calg and copying only the algorithm name: 	x-&amp;gt;calg = kmalloc_obj(*x-&amp;gt;calg); 	if (!x-&amp;gt;calg) { 		err = -ENOMEM; 		goto out; 	} 	strcpy(x-&amp;gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_name, a-&amp;gt;name); 	x-&amp;gt;props.calgo = sa-&amp;gt;sadb_sa_encrypt; Unlike the authentication (x-&amp;gt;aalg) and encryption (x-&amp;gt;ealg) branches of the same function, the compression branch never initializes calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len.  IPComp carries no key and the allocation only reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field is left containing uninitialized slab data. calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE: 	xfrm_state_migrate() 	  xfrm_state_clone_and_setup() 	    x-&amp;gt;calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig-&amp;gt;calg); 	      kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig)); where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8.  With a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the 68-byte calg object.  Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0):   BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60   Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287   CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1   Call Trace:    &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;    dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0    prin…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by allocating x-&amp;gt;calg and copying only the algorithm name: 	x-&amp;gt;calg = kmalloc_obj(*x-&amp;gt;calg); 	if (!x-&amp;gt;calg) { 		err = -ENOMEM; 		goto out; 	} 	strcpy(x-&amp;gt;calg-&amp;gt;alg_name, a-&amp;gt;name); 	x-&amp;gt;props.calgo = sa-&amp;gt;sadb_sa_encrypt; Unlike the authentication (x-&amp;gt;aalg) and encryption (x-&amp;gt;ealg) branches of the same function, the compression branch never initializes calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len.  IPComp carries no key and the allocation only reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field is left containing uninitialized slab data. calg-&amp;gt;alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE: 	xfrm_state_migrate() 	  xfrm_state_clone_and_setup() 	    x-&amp;gt;calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig-&amp;gt;calg); 	      kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig)); where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8.  With a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the 68-byte calg object.  Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0):   BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60   Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287   CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1   Call Trace:    &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;    dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0    prin…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64436</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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