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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 10:55:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-14291</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-14291</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-14291</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-14291</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-63892</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63892</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63892</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0926 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0926</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63892</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63892</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 to prevent size_t underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from
entry-&amp;gt;length (u16 widened to size_t).  Two distinct OOB conditions
follow when entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt; 4:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&amp;amp;block[dir_offset],
   sizeof(*dir-&amp;gt;uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from
   dir_offset.  tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces
   dir_offset + entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt;= block_len, so a crafted entry
   with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and
   entry-&amp;gt;length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy
   run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a
   500-dword block reads block[497..501]).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t
   to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry
   walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails
   validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup,
which closes both holes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&amp;amp;dir-&amp;gt;properties) up to immediately after
the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing
uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a
walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that
list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 to prevent size_t underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from
entry-&amp;gt;length (u16 widened to size_t).  Two distinct OOB conditions
follow when entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt; 4:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&amp;amp;block[dir_offset],
   sizeof(*dir-&amp;gt;uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from
   dir_offset.  tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces
   dir_offset + entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt;= block_len, so a crafted entry
   with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and
   entry-&amp;gt;length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy
   run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a
   500-dword block reads block[497..501]).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t
   to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry
   walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails
   validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup,
which closes both holes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&amp;amp;dir-&amp;gt;properties) up to immediately after
the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing
uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a
walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that
list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63892</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-c25w-638m-wrp7</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c25w-638m-wrp7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 to prevent size_t underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from
entry-&amp;gt;length (u16 widened to size_t).  Two distinct OOB conditions
follow when entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt; 4:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&amp;amp;block[dir_offset],
   sizeof(*dir-&amp;gt;uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from
   dir_offset.  tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces
   dir_offset + entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt;= block_len, so a crafted entry
   with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and
   entry-&amp;gt;length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy
   run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a
   500-dword block reads block[497..501]).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t
   to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry
   walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails
   validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup,
which closes both holes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&amp;amp;dir-&amp;gt;properties) up to immediately after
the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing
uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a
walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that
list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 to prevent size_t underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from
entry-&amp;gt;length (u16 widened to size_t).  Two distinct OOB conditions
follow when entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt; 4:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&amp;amp;block[dir_offset],
   sizeof(*dir-&amp;gt;uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from
   dir_offset.  tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces
   dir_offset + entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt;= block_len, so a crafted entry
   with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and
   entry-&amp;gt;length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy
   run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a
   500-dword block reads block[497..501]).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t
   to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry
   walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails
   validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup,
which closes both holes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&amp;amp;dir-&amp;gt;properties) up to immediately after
the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing
uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a
walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that
list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c25w-638m-wrp7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:21555-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21555-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21555-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23066-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-63892</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63892</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 237 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 to prevent size_t underflow On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from entry-&amp;gt;length (u16 widened to size_t).  Two distinct OOB conditions follow when entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt; 4: 1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&amp;amp;block[dir_offset],    sizeof(*dir-&amp;gt;uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from    dir_offset.  tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces    dir_offset + entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt;= block_len, so a crafted entry    with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and    entry-&amp;gt;length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy    run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a    500-dword block reads block[497..501]). 2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t    to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry    walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails    validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page. Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup, which closes both holes. Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&amp;amp;dir-&amp;gt;properties) up to immediately after the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 237 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 to prevent size_t underflow On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from entry-&amp;gt;length (u16 widened to size_t).  Two distinct OOB conditions follow when entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt; 4: 1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&amp;amp;block[dir_offset],    sizeof(*dir-&amp;gt;uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from    dir_offset.  tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces    dir_offset + entry-&amp;gt;length &amp;lt;= block_len, so a crafted entry    with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and    entry-&amp;gt;length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy    run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a    500-dword block reads block[497..501]). 2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t    to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry    walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails    validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page. Reject dir_len &amp;lt; 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup, which closes both holes. Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&amp;amp;dir-&amp;gt;properties) up to immediately after the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63892</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2403 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</guid>
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