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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63462</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63462</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Unleash is an open-source feature management platform. Prior to 7.5.2, 7.6.5, and 8.0.2, the shared OpenAPI validation error path in src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts passes a raw request value from lodash.get to JSON.stringify in genericErrorMessage and fromOpenApiValidationErrors without guarding stack exhaustion. An unauthenticated attacker can send a roughly 10 KB JSON value nested thousands of levels deep to POST /edge/validate, POST /edge/issue-token, or another OpenAPI-validated endpoint, causing RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded in openAPIValidationMiddleware and terminating the Node process because no uncaughtException handler recovers it. Replaying the request can sustain a complete service outage. This issue is fixed in versions 7.5.2, 7.6.5, and 8.0.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Unleash is an open-source feature management platform. Prior to 7.5.2, 7.6.5, and 8.0.2, the shared OpenAPI validation error path in src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts passes a raw request value from lodash.get to JSON.stringify in genericErrorMessage and fromOpenApiValidationErrors without guarding stack exhaustion. An unauthenticated attacker can send a roughly 10 KB JSON value nested thousands of levels deep to POST /edge/validate, POST /edge/issue-token, or another OpenAPI-validated endpoint, causing RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded in openAPIValidationMiddleware and terminating the Node process because no uncaughtException handler recovers it. Replaying the request can sustain a complete service outage. This issue is fixed in versions 7.5.2, 7.6.5, and 8.0.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63462</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r5pq-6chh-j3xp — Unleash: Unauthenticated single-request DoS via OpenAPI validation error formatter</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r5pq-6chh-j3xp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: unleash-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated `POST` to any OpenAPI-validated endpoint, including the anonymous `POST /edge/validate` and `POST /edge/issue-token`, crashes the entire Unleash server with one request body of deeply-nested JSON.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When request-body validation fails, Unleash builds the error message by calling `JSON.stringify` on the raw offending value taken from the request body. A value nested a few thousand levels deep makes `JSON.stringify` recurse past the V8 call-stack limit and throw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The throw is synchronous inside an Express error-handling middleware that has no try/catch, and the process registers no `uncaughtException` handler (only `unhandledRejection`). Node terminates the process with `exit(1)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The body parser sets no JSON nesting-depth limit, the payload (about 10 KB at depth 5000) stays far under the 100 KB body-size limit, and the same error formatter serves every API route, so the trigger is route-independent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Result: a remote attacker with no account, token, or cookie takes the whole server offline with a single 10 KB request, and keeps it offline by replaying it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unleash OSS server, confirmed live-exploitable on v8.0.0 (`unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.0`).
Vulnerable code is the shared request-validation error path (`src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts` `genericErrorMessage`), present on current `main`.
Reachable on a stock install: no feature flag, no setting, no authentication, no CSRF token, and…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: unleash-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated `POST` to any OpenAPI-validated endpoint, including the anonymous `POST /edge/validate` and `POST /edge/issue-token`, crashes the entire Unleash server with one request body of deeply-nested JSON.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When request-body validation fails, Unleash builds the error message by calling `JSON.stringify` on the raw offending value taken from the request body. A value nested a few thousand levels deep makes `JSON.stringify` recurse past the V8 call-stack limit and throw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The throw is synchronous inside an Express error-handling middleware that has no try/catch, and the process registers no `uncaughtException` handler (only `unhandledRejection`). Node terminates the process with `exit(1)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The body parser sets no JSON nesting-depth limit, the payload (about 10 KB at depth 5000) stays far under the 100 KB body-size limit, and the same error formatter serves every API route, so the trigger is route-independent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Result: a remote attacker with no account, token, or cookie takes the whole server offline with a single 10 KB request, and keeps it offline by replaying it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unleash OSS server, confirmed live-exploitable on v8.0.0 (`unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.0`).
Vulnerable code is the shared request-validation error path (`src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts` `genericErrorMessage`), present on current `main`.
Reachable on a stock install: no feature flag, no setting, no authentication, no CSRF token, and…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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