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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 19:06:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-61609</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61609</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Pterodactyl is a free, open-source game server management panel. From 1.7.0 until 1.13.0, the authentication rate limiter defined in RouteServiceProvider::configureRateLimiting() applied a single global bucket to the login and two-factor checkpoint endpoints instead of keying by IP or account: the fall-through Limit::perMinute(10) covering POST /auth/login and POST /auth/login/checkpoint omitted -&amp;gt;by(), so Laravel derived a constant cache key (md5(&amp;#39;authentication&amp;#39;)) shared by every request. An unauthenticated attacker sending roughly ten requests per minute from a single IP, most cheaply against the checkpoint endpoint (which has no reCAPTCHA), exhausts the shared counter and causes HTTP 429 for every user attempting to log in or complete two-factor authentication, a panel-wide authentication denial of service that also locks out administrators. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Pterodactyl is a free, open-source game server management panel. From 1.7.0 until 1.13.0, the authentication rate limiter defined in RouteServiceProvider::configureRateLimiting() applied a single global bucket to the login and two-factor checkpoint endpoints instead of keying by IP or account: the fall-through Limit::perMinute(10) covering POST /auth/login and POST /auth/login/checkpoint omitted -&amp;gt;by(), so Laravel derived a constant cache key (md5(&amp;#39;authentication&amp;#39;)) shared by every request. An unauthenticated attacker sending roughly ten requests per minute from a single IP, most cheaply against the checkpoint endpoint (which has no reCAPTCHA), exhausts the shared counter and causes HTTP 429 for every user attempting to log in or complete two-factor authentication, a panel-wide authentication denial of service that also locks out administrators. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61609</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xvc3-826v-xf47 — Pterodactyl's shared global rate-limit key on login and 2FA checkpoint enables unauthenticated panel-wide authenticatio…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xvc3-826v-xf47</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: pterodactyl/panel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `authentication` rate limiter used for the login and two-factor checkpoint endpoints applies a single global bucket shared by every client, instead of keying per IP or per account. An unauthenticated attacker sending ~10 requests per minute from one IP exhausts the shared bucket and causes HTTP 429 for every user on every IP attempting to log in or complete 2FA, for as long as the attack is sustained. This is a trivially triggered, unauthenticated, panel-wide authentication denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In `app/Providers/RouteServiceProvider::configureRateLimiting()` the limiter is defined as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
RateLimiter::for(&amp;#39;authentication&amp;#39;, function (Request $request) {
    if ($request-&amp;gt;route()-&amp;gt;named(&amp;#39;auth.post.forgot-password&amp;#39;)) {
        return Limit::perMinute(2)-&amp;gt;by($request-&amp;gt;ip());
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;return Limit::perMinute(10);
});
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The forgot-password branch is correctly scoped with `-&amp;gt;by($request-&amp;gt;ip())`. The fall-through return, which covers `POST /auth/login` and `POST /auth/login/checkpoint` (see `routes/auth.php`, the `throttle:authentication` group), omits `-&amp;gt;by()` entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For a named limiter, Laravel 11 derives the cache key as `md5($limiterName . $limit-&amp;gt;key)` (`Illuminate\Routing\Middleware\ThrottleRequests::handleRequestUsingNamedLimiter`). `Limit::perMinute(10)` is constructed with an empty `key`, so the resolved key is `md5(&amp;#39;authentication&amp;#39;)`, a constant identical for every incoming request. All clients therefore contend for one shared counte…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: pterodactyl/panel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `authentication` rate limiter used for the login and two-factor checkpoint endpoints applies a single global bucket shared by every client, instead of keying per IP or per account. An unauthenticated attacker sending ~10 requests per minute from one IP exhausts the shared bucket and causes HTTP 429 for every user on every IP attempting to log in or complete 2FA, for as long as the attack is sustained. This is a trivially triggered, unauthenticated, panel-wide authentication denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In `app/Providers/RouteServiceProvider::configureRateLimiting()` the limiter is defined as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
RateLimiter::for(&amp;#39;authentication&amp;#39;, function (Request $request) {
    if ($request-&amp;gt;route()-&amp;gt;named(&amp;#39;auth.post.forgot-password&amp;#39;)) {
        return Limit::perMinute(2)-&amp;gt;by($request-&amp;gt;ip());
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;return Limit::perMinute(10);
});
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The forgot-password branch is correctly scoped with `-&amp;gt;by($request-&amp;gt;ip())`. The fall-through return, which covers `POST /auth/login` and `POST /auth/login/checkpoint` (see `routes/auth.php`, the `throttle:authentication` group), omits `-&amp;gt;by()` entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For a named limiter, Laravel 11 derives the cache key as `md5($limiterName . $limit-&amp;gt;key)` (`Illuminate\Routing\Middleware\ThrottleRequests::handleRequestUsingNamedLimiter`). `Limit::perMinute(10)` is constructed with an empty `key`, so the resolved key is `md5(&amp;#39;authentication&amp;#39;)`, a constant identical for every incoming request. All clients therefore contend for one shared counte…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xvc3-826v-xf47</guid>
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