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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-61446</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61446</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI (praisonaiagents) before 1.6.78 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in the plugin manager, which loads and executes arbitrary Python (.py) files from project-level and user-home .praisonai/plugins/ directories using importlib spec_from_file_location() and exec_module() without code signing, integrity verification, or sandboxing. An attacker who can write a malicious .py file to a plugin directory (for example via path traversal, a supply chain attack, or a compromised dependency) achieves arbitrary code execution when the plugin system initializes.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI (praisonaiagents) before 1.6.78 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in the plugin manager, which loads and executes arbitrary Python (.py) files from project-level and user-home .praisonai/plugins/ directories using importlib spec_from_file_location() and exec_module() without code signing, integrity verification, or sandboxing. An attacker who can write a malicious .py file to a plugin directory (for example via path traversal, a supply chain attack, or a compromised dependency) achieves arbitrary code execution when the plugin system initializes.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61446</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m6wp-h223-4c8g — PraisonAI: Plugin Auto-Discovery Executes Arbitrary Python Files Without Verification</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-m6wp-h223-4c8g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The plugin manager loads and executes arbitrary `.py` files from `.praisonai/plugins/` directories (both project-level and user home) via `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location()` + `exec_module()` with zero code signing, integrity verification, or sandboxing. Any attacker who can write a file to the plugins directory (via path traversal, supply chain attack, or compromised dependency) achieves arbitrary code execution when the plugin system initializes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/manager.py` (lines 163-196):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _load_plugin_file(self, file_path: Path) -&amp;gt; Optional[Plugin]:
    module_name = f&amp;#34;praison_plugin_{file_path.stem}_{id(file_path)}&amp;#34;
    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, file_path)
    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
    sys.modules[module_name] = module
    spec.loader.exec_module(module)  # Executes arbitrary Python code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if hasattr(module, &amp;#34;create_plugin&amp;#34;):
        return module.create_plugin()  # Calls arbitrary function
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/discovery.py` (lines 38-39):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# Auto-discovery paths:
# 1. Project: ./.praisonai/plugins/
# 2. User: ~/.praisonai/plugins/
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No code signing, hash verification, or sandboxing is applied. The only validation is checking for a `Plugin Name` field in the file&amp;#39;s docstring header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
from praisonaiagents.plugins.discovery import load_plugin
import tempfile, os&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Create a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The plugin manager loads and executes arbitrary `.py` files from `.praisonai/plugins/` directories (both project-level and user home) via `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location()` + `exec_module()` with zero code signing, integrity verification, or sandboxing. Any attacker who can write a file to the plugins directory (via path traversal, supply chain attack, or compromised dependency) achieves arbitrary code execution when the plugin system initializes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/manager.py` (lines 163-196):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _load_plugin_file(self, file_path: Path) -&amp;gt; Optional[Plugin]:
    module_name = f&amp;#34;praison_plugin_{file_path.stem}_{id(file_path)}&amp;#34;
    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, file_path)
    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
    sys.modules[module_name] = module
    spec.loader.exec_module(module)  # Executes arbitrary Python code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if hasattr(module, &amp;#34;create_plugin&amp;#34;):
        return module.create_plugin()  # Calls arbitrary function
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/discovery.py` (lines 38-39):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# Auto-discovery paths:
# 1. Project: ./.praisonai/plugins/
# 2. User: ~/.praisonai/plugins/
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No code signing, hash verification, or sandboxing is applied. The only validation is checking for a `Plugin Name` field in the file&amp;#39;s docstring header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
from praisonaiagents.plugins.discovery import load_plugin
import tempfile, os&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Create a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-m6wp-h223-4c8g</guid>
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