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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:19:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-56737</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-56737</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Versions 3.2.0 through 4.1.5 contain an authentication bypass in its public two-factor authentication verification flow: an unauthenticated attacker can submit an account’s numeric user ID and a valid or brute-forced six-digit TOTP code without first authenticating with the account password, allowing takeover of any 2FA-enabled account, including administrator accounts. Version 4.1.6 is patched by binding TOTP verification to a session established after successful password authentication and limiting failed TOTP attempts. No official workaround is documented; affected installations should upgrade to 4.1.6 or later.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Versions 3.2.0 through 4.1.5 contain an authentication bypass in its public two-factor authentication verification flow: an unauthenticated attacker can submit an account’s numeric user ID and a valid or brute-forced six-digit TOTP code without first authenticating with the account password, allowing takeover of any 2FA-enabled account, including administrator accounts. Version 4.1.6 is patched by binding TOTP verification to a session established after successful password authentication and limiting failed TOTP attempts. No official workaround is documented; affected installations should upgrade to 4.1.6 or later.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-56737</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5 — phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: thorsten/phpmyfaq, Packagist: phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid
6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require — and is not bound to — a prior
successful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker
can authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit
code) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an
authentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
#[Route(path: &amp;#39;/check&amp;#39;, name: &amp;#39;public.auth.check&amp;#39;, methods: [&amp;#39;POST&amp;#39;])]
public function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
    if ($this-&amp;gt;currentUser-&amp;gt;isLoggedIn()) {
        return new RedirectResponse(url: &amp;#39;./&amp;#39;);
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$token  = Filter::filterVar($request-&amp;gt;request-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;token&amp;#39;), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request-&amp;gt;request-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;user-id&amp;#39;), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ($userId &amp;lt;= 0) { /* ... */ }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$this-&amp;gt;currentUserService-&amp;gt;getUserById($userId);          // loads attacker-chosen user&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (strlen((string) $token) === 6) {
        $result = $this-&amp;gt;twoFactor-&amp;gt;validateToken($token, $userId);
        if ($result) {
            $this-&amp;gt;currentUserService-&amp;gt;twoFactorSuccess();    // full login, no password ever c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: thorsten/phpmyfaq, Packagist: phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid
6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require — and is not bound to — a prior
successful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker
can authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit
code) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an
authentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
#[Route(path: &amp;#39;/check&amp;#39;, name: &amp;#39;public.auth.check&amp;#39;, methods: [&amp;#39;POST&amp;#39;])]
public function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
    if ($this-&amp;gt;currentUser-&amp;gt;isLoggedIn()) {
        return new RedirectResponse(url: &amp;#39;./&amp;#39;);
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$token  = Filter::filterVar($request-&amp;gt;request-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;token&amp;#39;), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request-&amp;gt;request-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;user-id&amp;#39;), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ($userId &amp;lt;= 0) { /* ... */ }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$this-&amp;gt;currentUserService-&amp;gt;getUserById($userId);          // loads attacker-chosen user&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (strlen((string) $token) === 6) {
        $result = $this-&amp;gt;twoFactor-&amp;gt;validateToken($token, $userId);
        if ($result) {
            $this-&amp;gt;currentUserService-&amp;gt;twoFactorSuccess();    // full login, no password ever c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5</guid>
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