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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54685</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54685</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to version 1.3.2-beta, the `/api/auth/login` authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a `401`/`403` response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time. Version 1.3.2-beta patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to version 1.3.2-beta, the `/api/auth/login` authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a `401`/`403` response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time. Version 1.3.2-beta patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54685</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7789-65hx-f26w — FileBrowser Quantum has Username Enumeration via Authentication Timing Side-Channel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7789-65hx-f26w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/api/auth/login` authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a `401`/`403` response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in the `Auth` function of `JSONAuth` in `auth/json.go` (lines 45–52). The function performs a database lookup for the user prior to performing any password validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
user, err := userStore.Get(username)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;unable to get user from store: %v&amp;#34;, err)
	}
	err = users.CheckPwd(password, user.Password)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the username is not found, the function returns an error immediately. If the username is found, the function calls `CheckPwd`, which executes the bcrypt hash comparison. Because bcrypt is intentionally computationally expensive, this introduces a measurable delay in the response time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can distinguish valid usernames from invalid ones by measuring the authentication response times.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In testing, responses for valid usernames consistently required approximately 40–50 ms due to the bcrypt comparison, while invalid usernames returned in approximately 1–4 ms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The script below automates this attack by calibrating the network latency using non-existent usernames to establish a baseline and then test…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/api/auth/login` authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a `401`/`403` response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in the `Auth` function of `JSONAuth` in `auth/json.go` (lines 45–52). The function performs a database lookup for the user prior to performing any password validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
user, err := userStore.Get(username)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;unable to get user from store: %v&amp;#34;, err)
	}
	err = users.CheckPwd(password, user.Password)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the username is not found, the function returns an error immediately. If the username is found, the function calls `CheckPwd`, which executes the bcrypt hash comparison. Because bcrypt is intentionally computationally expensive, this introduces a measurable delay in the response time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can distinguish valid usernames from invalid ones by measuring the authentication response times.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In testing, responses for valid usernames consistently required approximately 40–50 ms due to the bcrypt comparison, while invalid usernames returned in approximately 1–4 ms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The script below automates this attack by calibrating the network latency using non-existent usernames to establish a baseline and then test…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7789-65hx-f26w</guid>
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