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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54179</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54179</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;backpack/crud provides Create, Read, Update &amp;amp; Delete (CRUD) functions for Backpack, a collection of Laravel packages that help users build custom administration panels. From 6.0.0 until 6.8.14 and 7.0.37, the src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php methods SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles and SingleBase64Image::uploadRepeatableFiles, used by image fields through withFiles(), accept any data URI beginning with data:image without validating the declared MIME subtype or decoded bytes, while src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php method FileNameGenerator::getExtensionFromFile applies mime_content_type() to the data URI instead of the decoded content. An authenticated administrator can therefore store arbitrary file content under an extensionless filename on the configured disk, which can cause stored cross-site scripting or other unintended behavior when the file is served and accessed. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.38 and 6.8.14.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;backpack/crud provides Create, Read, Update &amp;amp; Delete (CRUD) functions for Backpack, a collection of Laravel packages that help users build custom administration panels. From 6.0.0 until 6.8.14 and 7.0.37, the src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php methods SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles and SingleBase64Image::uploadRepeatableFiles, used by image fields through withFiles(), accept any data URI beginning with data:image without validating the declared MIME subtype or decoded bytes, while src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php method FileNameGenerator::getExtensionFromFile applies mime_content_type() to the data URI instead of the decoded content. An authenticated administrator can therefore store arbitrary file content under an extensionless filename on the configured disk, which can cause stored cross-site scripting or other unintended behavior when the file is served and accessed. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.38 and 6.8.14.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54179</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg — Laravel Backpack CRUD: SingleBase64Image accepts any base64 payload behind a `data:image` prefix — SVG-with-script land…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: backpack/crud&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php
if (Str::startsWith($value, &amp;#39;data:image&amp;#39;)) {
    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated
    $base64Image = Str::after($value, &amp;#39;;base64,&amp;#39;);
    $finalPath   = $this-&amp;gt;getPath() . $this-&amp;gt;getFileName($value);
    Storage::disk($this-&amp;gt;getDisk())-&amp;gt;put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));
    return $finalPath;
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php
private function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string
{
    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)
        ? $file-&amp;gt;extension()
        : Str::after(mime_content_type($file), &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;); // returns false on data URIs → empty string
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The stored filename ends with a trailing dot and no extension.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated admin submitting a malicious payload to a Backpack `image` field stored wit…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: backpack/crud&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php
if (Str::startsWith($value, &amp;#39;data:image&amp;#39;)) {
    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated
    $base64Image = Str::after($value, &amp;#39;;base64,&amp;#39;);
    $finalPath   = $this-&amp;gt;getPath() . $this-&amp;gt;getFileName($value);
    Storage::disk($this-&amp;gt;getDisk())-&amp;gt;put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));
    return $finalPath;
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php
private function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string
{
    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)
        ? $file-&amp;gt;extension()
        : Str::after(mime_content_type($file), &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;); // returns false on data URIs → empty string
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The stored filename ends with a trailing dot and no extension.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated admin submitting a malicious payload to a Backpack `image` field stored wit…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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