<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 05:30:37 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54178</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54178</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;backpack/crud provides Create, Read, Update &amp;amp; Delete (CRUD) functions for Backpack, a collection of Laravel packages that help users build custom administration panels. Prior to 6.8.12 and 7.0.35, HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk in src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php trusts disk-relative paths from clear_&amp;lt;attribute&amp;gt;[] and passes them to Storage::disk()-&amp;gt;delete without confirming that the paths are persisted on the current model record. An authenticated user with Update access to a CRUD using this mutator through src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php can delete another record&amp;#39;s attachment, a shared asset, or another operational file on the configured disk by submitting its path. The newer MultipleFiles uploader is not affected because it intersects requested deletions with the record&amp;#39;s persisted file list. This flaw does not permit reading the deleted files. The 5.x line remains affected through its final releases. This issue is fixed in versions 6.8.12 and 7.0.35.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;backpack/crud provides Create, Read, Update &amp;amp; Delete (CRUD) functions for Backpack, a collection of Laravel packages that help users build custom administration panels. Prior to 6.8.12 and 7.0.35, HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk in src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php trusts disk-relative paths from clear_&amp;lt;attribute&amp;gt;[] and passes them to Storage::disk()-&amp;gt;delete without confirming that the paths are persisted on the current model record. An authenticated user with Update access to a CRUD using this mutator through src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php can delete another record&amp;#39;s attachment, a shared asset, or another operational file on the configured disk by submitting its path. The newer MultipleFiles uploader is not affected because it intersects requested deletions with the record&amp;#39;s persisted file list. This flaw does not permit reading the deleted files. The 5.x line remains affected through its final releases. This issue is fixed in versions 6.8.12 and 7.0.35.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54178</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25 — Laravel Backpack CRUD: Arbitrary file deletion via attacker-controlled clear_&lt;attr&gt;[] in HasUploadFields::uploadMultipl…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8xjm-wqrp-2f25</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: backpack/crud&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_&amp;lt;attribute&amp;gt;[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_&amp;lt;attr&amp;gt;[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()-&amp;gt;delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)
- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x &amp;lt; 6.8.12, and 7.x &amp;lt; 7.0.35 releases.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with low-privilege Backpack admin access (e.g. a content editor) can delete any file under the configured disk root: other records&amp;#39; attachments, shared assets, or files placed on the same disk for operational purposes. No confidentiality impact (files cannot be read, only deleted).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**CWE-285** (Aut…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: backpack/crud&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_&amp;lt;attribute&amp;gt;[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_&amp;lt;attr&amp;gt;[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()-&amp;gt;delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)
- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x &amp;lt; 6.8.12, and 7.x &amp;lt; 7.0.35 releases.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with low-privilege Backpack admin access (e.g. a content editor) can delete any file under the configured disk root: other records&amp;#39; attachments, shared assets, or files placed on the same disk for operational purposes. No confidentiality impact (files cannot be read, only deleted).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**CWE-285** (Aut…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8xjm-wqrp-2f25</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
