https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 20:57:52 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53600 <p>async-tar is a tar archive reading/writing library for async Rust. Prior to version 0.6.1, async-tar mis-applies a buffered PAX size extension to an intermediary extension header (a GNU longname L, a GNU longlink K, or a PAX x/g header) instead of to the next file entry. POSIX requires a PAX extended-header record set to describe the next file entry, never an intervening extension header. Because poll_next_raw (src/archive.rs) threads the buffered PAX records into the size computation of whatever raw header it reads next — and that header can be an intermediary L — the stream cursor is advanced by an attacker-chosen amount when the L body is consumed. The parser then desyncs relative to a POSIX-correct tar parser (e.g. GNU tar), reading subsequent bytes at the wrong block boundary. This issue has been patched in version 0.6.1.</p> <p>async-tar is a tar archive reading/writing library for async Rust. Prior to version 0.6.1, async-tar mis-applies a buffered PAX size extension to an intermediary extension header (a GNU longname L, a GNU longlink K, or a PAX x/g header) instead of to the next file entry. POSIX requires a PAX extended-header record set to describe the next file entry, never an intervening extension header. Because poll_next_raw (src/archive.rs) threads the buffered PAX records into the size computation of whatever raw header it reads next — and that header can be an intermediary L — the stream cursor is advanced by an attacker-chosen amount when the L body is consumed. The parser then desyncs relative to a POSIX-correct tar parser (e.g. GNU tar), reading subsequent bytes at the wrong block boundary. This issue has been patched in version 0.6.1.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53600 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-35rm-7j9c-2f7m <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: async-tar</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`async-tar` v0.6.0 mis-applies a buffered PAX `size` extension to an intermediary extension header (a GNU longname `L`, a GNU longlink `K`, or a PAX `x`/`g` header) instead of to the next *file* entry. POSIX requires a PAX extended-header record set to describe the next file entry, never an intervening extension header. Because `poll_next_raw` (`src/archive.rs`) threads the buffered PAX records into the size computation of whatever raw header it reads next — and that header can be an intermediary `L` — the stream cursor is advanced by an attacker-chosen amount when the `L` body is consumed. The parser then desyncs relative to a POSIX-correct tar parser (e.g. GNU tar), reading subsequent bytes at the wrong block boundary.</p> <p>An attacker who can influence a tar stream that an `async-tar` consumer extracts can construct an `x → L → file` sequence whose entry list and on-disk result differ between `async-tar` and a reference parser. This enables content/entry smuggling: a file that a GNU-tar-based scanner/validator/AV sees as benign opaque data is extracted by `async-tar` as a different file with different bytes (e.g. an executable script), and vice versa.</p> <p>Type confusion / improper validation of the specified quantity (size). CWE-20, CWE-843. Severity assessed Medium, consistent with the same defect class in the upstream tar-rs / tokio-tar lineage.</p> <p>## Affected code</p> <p>Package: `async-tar` (crates.io). Affected version: **0.6.0** (latest release) and current `main` HEAD…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: async-tar</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`async-tar` v0.6.0 mis-applies a buffered PAX `size` extension to an intermediary extension header (a GNU longname `L`, a GNU longlink `K`, or a PAX `x`/`g` header) instead of to the next *file* entry. POSIX requires a PAX extended-header record set to describe the next file entry, never an intervening extension header. Because `poll_next_raw` (`src/archive.rs`) threads the buffered PAX records into the size computation of whatever raw header it reads next — and that header can be an intermediary `L` — the stream cursor is advanced by an attacker-chosen amount when the `L` body is consumed. The parser then desyncs relative to a POSIX-correct tar parser (e.g. GNU tar), reading subsequent bytes at the wrong block boundary.</p> <p>An attacker who can influence a tar stream that an `async-tar` consumer extracts can construct an `x → L → file` sequence whose entry list and on-disk result differ between `async-tar` and a reference parser. This enables content/entry smuggling: a file that a GNU-tar-based scanner/validator/AV sees as benign opaque data is extracted by `async-tar` as a different file with different bytes (e.g. an executable script), and vice versa.</p> <p>Type confusion / improper validation of the specified quantity (size). CWE-20, CWE-843. Severity assessed Medium, consistent with the same defect class in the upstream tar-rs / tokio-tar lineage.</p> <p>## Affected code</p> <p>Package: `async-tar` (crates.io). Affected version: **0.6.0** (latest release) and current `main` HEAD…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-35rm-7j9c-2f7m https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-53600 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-async-tar</p> <p>async-tar is a tar archive reading/writing library for async Rust. Prior to version 0.6.1, async-tar mis-applies a buffered PAX size extension to an intermediary extension header (a GNU longname L, a GNU longlink K, or a PAX x/g header) instead of to the next file entry. POSIX requires a PAX extended-header record set to describe the next file entry, never an intervening extension header. Because poll_next_raw (src/archive.rs) threads the buffered PAX records into the size computation of whatever raw header it reads next — and that header can be an intermediary L — the stream cursor is advanced by an attacker-chosen amount when the L body is consumed. The parser then desyncs relative to a POSIX-correct tar parser (e.g. GNU tar), reading subsequent bytes at the wrong block boundary. This issue has been patched in version 0.6.1.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-async-tar</p> <p>async-tar is a tar archive reading/writing library for async Rust. Prior to version 0.6.1, async-tar mis-applies a buffered PAX size extension to an intermediary extension header (a GNU longname L, a GNU longlink K, or a PAX x/g header) instead of to the next file entry. POSIX requires a PAX extended-header record set to describe the next file entry, never an intervening extension header. Because poll_next_raw (src/archive.rs) threads the buffered PAX records into the size computation of whatever raw header it reads next — and that header can be an intermediary L — the stream cursor is advanced by an attacker-chosen amount when the L body is consumed. The parser then desyncs relative to a POSIX-correct tar parser (e.g. GNU tar), reading subsequent bytes at the wrong block boundary. This issue has been patched in version 0.6.1.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-53600