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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 21:02:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-52817</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52817</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins provides monitoring plugins for Icinga, Nagios, and related systems. Prior to version 5.1.0, the shipped assets/sudoers/Debian.sudoers policy allowed the nagios or icinga account to execute /usr/bin/apt-get as root without restricting its arguments. An attacker who already controls that monitoring account can supply the APT::Update::Pre-Invoke option to execute an arbitrary command while apt-get runs with root privileges, resulting in a root shell and complete compromise of the host. The vulnerable rule supports the check-plugins/deb-updates/deb-updates plugin, but it authorized arbitrary apt-get argument sequences rather than only the required apt-get update --quiet 2 command. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins provides monitoring plugins for Icinga, Nagios, and related systems. Prior to version 5.1.0, the shipped assets/sudoers/Debian.sudoers policy allowed the nagios or icinga account to execute /usr/bin/apt-get as root without restricting its arguments. An attacker who already controls that monitoring account can supply the APT::Update::Pre-Invoke option to execute an arbitrary command while apt-get runs with root privileges, resulting in a root shell and complete compromise of the host. The vulnerable rule supports the check-plugins/deb-updates/deb-updates plugin, but it authorized arbitrary apt-get argument sequences rather than only the required apt-get update --quiet 2 command. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52817</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8w6w-23mq-h8rg — Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins: Sudoers may be able to obtain privilege escalation via /usr/bin/apt-get arguments</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8w6w-23mq-h8rg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: linuxfabrik-lib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In the [Debian.sudoers](https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/main/assets/sudoers/Debian.sudoers) file, `apt-get` is allowed for the nagios user. The full command including the arguments are not enforced and can therefore be choosen arbitrarily. This allows to easily get a root shell as the nagios user:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
By choosing a particular argument, you can get (as a nagios user) a root shell:
```
sudo apt-get update -o APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::=&amp;#34;/bin/sh&amp;#34;
```
Since the nagious user can use sudo to run apt-get as root, the resulting shell is also running as root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
The vulnerability is a local privilege escalation, impacting users who use the provided sudoers file. It requires that an attacker already compromised the nagios account (which is quite a high barrier to be honest).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix
Since only one place where `apt-get` is currently used (in [deb-updates](https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/998302a5fb43e89df1359f4cbb6558f81c96ae4f/check-plugins/deb-updates/deb-updates#L124)) was found, it should be enough to allow only the specific arguments used there.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here an example how the line in the sudoers file could look like:
```
                    /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/strongswan-connections,\
                    /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/systemd-unit,\
                    /usr/bin/apt-get update --quiet 2
```&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: linuxfabrik-lib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In the [Debian.sudoers](https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/main/assets/sudoers/Debian.sudoers) file, `apt-get` is allowed for the nagios user. The full command including the arguments are not enforced and can therefore be choosen arbitrarily. This allows to easily get a root shell as the nagios user:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
By choosing a particular argument, you can get (as a nagios user) a root shell:
```
sudo apt-get update -o APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::=&amp;#34;/bin/sh&amp;#34;
```
Since the nagious user can use sudo to run apt-get as root, the resulting shell is also running as root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
The vulnerability is a local privilege escalation, impacting users who use the provided sudoers file. It requires that an attacker already compromised the nagios account (which is quite a high barrier to be honest).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix
Since only one place where `apt-get` is currently used (in [deb-updates](https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/998302a5fb43e89df1359f4cbb6558f81c96ae4f/check-plugins/deb-updates/deb-updates#L124)) was found, it should be enough to allow only the specific arguments used there.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here an example how the line in the sudoers file could look like:
```
                    /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/strongswan-connections,\
                    /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/systemd-unit,\
                    /usr/bin/apt-get update --quiet 2
```&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8w6w-23mq-h8rg</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2595 — Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins: Sudoers may be able to obtain privilege escalation via /usr/bin/apt-get arguments</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2595</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: linuxfabrik-lib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In the [Debian.sudoers](https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/main/assets/sudoers/Debian.sudoers) file, `apt-get` is allowed for the nagios user. The full command including the arguments are not enforced and can therefore be choosen arbitrarily. This allows to easily get a root shell as the nagios user:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
By choosing a particular argument, you can get (as a nagios user) a root shell:
```
sudo apt-get update -o APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::=&amp;#34;/bin/sh&amp;#34;
```
Since the nagious user can use sudo to run apt-get as root, the resulting shell is also running as root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
The vulnerability is a local privilege escalation, impacting users who use the provided sudoers file. It requires that an attacker already compromised the nagios account (which is quite a high barrier to be honest).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix
Since only one place where `apt-get` is currently used (in [deb-updates](https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/998302a5fb43e89df1359f4cbb6558f81c96ae4f/check-plugins/deb-updates/deb-updates#L124)) was found, it should be enough to allow only the specific arguments used there.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here an example how the line in the sudoers file could look like:
```
                    /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/strongswan-connections,\
                    /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/systemd-unit,\
                    /usr/bin/apt-get update --quiet 2
```&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: linuxfabrik-lib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In the [Debian.sudoers](https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/main/assets/sudoers/Debian.sudoers) file, `apt-get` is allowed for the nagios user. The full command including the arguments are not enforced and can therefore be choosen arbitrarily. This allows to easily get a root shell as the nagios user:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
By choosing a particular argument, you can get (as a nagios user) a root shell:
```
sudo apt-get update -o APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::=&amp;#34;/bin/sh&amp;#34;
```
Since the nagious user can use sudo to run apt-get as root, the resulting shell is also running as root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
The vulnerability is a local privilege escalation, impacting users who use the provided sudoers file. It requires that an attacker already compromised the nagios account (which is quite a high barrier to be honest).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix
Since only one place where `apt-get` is currently used (in [deb-updates](https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/998302a5fb43e89df1359f4cbb6558f81c96ae4f/check-plugins/deb-updates/deb-updates#L124)) was found, it should be enough to allow only the specific arguments used there.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here an example how the line in the sudoers file could look like:
```
                    /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/strongswan-connections,\
                    /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/systemd-unit,\
                    /usr/bin/apt-get update --quiet 2
```&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2595</guid>
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