https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 02:31:23 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bt80684 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: cosign, CleanStart: kyverno, CleanStart: policy-controller-fips, CleanStart: spire-server, CleanStart: spire-server-fips, CleanStart: tekton-chains, CleanStart: tekton-chains-fips, CleanStart: tkn, CleanStart: tkn-fips</p> <p>CVE-2026-48702 affects multiple packages. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: cosign, CleanStart: kyverno, CleanStart: policy-controller-fips, CleanStart: spire-server, CleanStart: spire-server-fips, CleanStart: tekton-chains, CleanStart: tekton-chains-fips, CleanStart: tkn, CleanStart: tkn-fips</p> <p>CVE-2026-48702 affects multiple packages. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bt80684 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48702 <p>Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server&#39;s recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on…</p> <p>Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server&#39;s recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48702 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-47q9-m4ww-924m <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/sigstore/rekor</p> <p>## Description</p> <p>The `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory.</p> <p>An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server&#39;s recover() middleware.</p> <p>This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints: - POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry) - POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)</p> <p>Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression.</p> <p>## Workarounds</p> <p>There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/sigstore/rekor</p> <p>## Description</p> <p>The `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory.</p> <p>An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server&#39;s recover() middleware.</p> <p>This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints: - POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry) - POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)</p> <p>Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression.</p> <p>## Workarounds</p> <p>There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-47q9-m4ww-924m https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11154-1 <p>hauler-2.0.1-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>hauler-2.0.1-1.1 on GA media</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11154-1 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:25138 <p>github.com/jackc/pgx: golang: pgx: SQL injection via specific SQL query conditions go.opentelemetry.io/otel: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.0: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.1: OpenTelemetry-Go: Denial of Service due to file descriptor leak github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor: Denial of Service due to unbounded gzip decompression in Alpine APK parsing</p> <p>github.com/jackc/pgx: golang: pgx: SQL injection via specific SQL query conditions go.opentelemetry.io/otel: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.0: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.1: OpenTelemetry-Go: Denial of Service due to file descriptor leak github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor: Denial of Service due to unbounded gzip decompression in Alpine APK parsing</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:25138 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-48702 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: rekor</p> <p>Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server&#39;s recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: rekor</p> <p>Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server&#39;s recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-48702