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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 06:38:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-47226</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47226</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, an authenticated Admidio member with upload rights on any one folder can permanently delete files from folders where they have only view access. The authorization check at the top of `modules/documents-files.php` evaluates upload rights against the attacker-supplied `folder_uuid` URL parameter — not the file&amp;#39;s actual parent folder. The `file_delete` handler then only verifies view rights on the file&amp;#39;s real location, never upload rights. By passing a folder they legitimately own in `folder_uuid` while targeting a file in a restricted folder via `file_uuid`, an attacker bypasses the upload-right check entirely and permanently deletes the file. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f, which was patched in v5.0.7 but remains exploitable in v5.0.9. User should upgrade to v5.0.10 to receive an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, an authenticated Admidio member with upload rights on any one folder can permanently delete files from folders where they have only view access. The authorization check at the top of `modules/documents-files.php` evaluates upload rights against the attacker-supplied `folder_uuid` URL parameter — not the file&amp;#39;s actual parent folder. The `file_delete` handler then only verifies view rights on the file&amp;#39;s real location, never upload rights. By passing a folder they legitimately own in `folder_uuid` while targeting a file in a restricted folder via `file_uuid`, an attacker bypasses the upload-right check entirely and permanently deletes the file. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f, which was patched in v5.0.7 but remains exploitable in v5.0.9. User should upgrade to v5.0.10 to receive an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47226</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qc4c-hrmc-4f78 — Admidio: Authorization bypass in file_delete enables cross-folder file removal by authenticated users without delete pr…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qc4c-hrmc-4f78</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: admidio/admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated Admidio member with upload rights on **any one folder** can permanently delete files from folders where they have only view access. The authorization check at the top of `modules/documents-files.php` evaluates upload rights against the attacker-supplied `folder_uuid` URL parameter — not the file&amp;#39;s actual parent folder. The `file_delete` handler then only verifies view rights on the file&amp;#39;s real location, never upload rights. By passing a folder they legitimately own in `folder_uuid` while targeting a file in a restricted folder via `file_uuid`, an attacker bypasses the upload-right check entirely and permanently deletes the file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an **incomplete fix** of [GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f](https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f), which was patched in v5.0.7 but remains exploitable in v5.0.9.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected Version:** Admidio v5.0.9&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root Cause File:** `modules/documents-files.php`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Issue 1 — `folder_uuid` is not required for `file_delete` mode (line 67):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$getFolderUUID = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, &amp;#39;folder_uuid&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;uuid&amp;#39;, array(
    &amp;#39;requireValue&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; !in_array($getMode, array(&amp;#39;list&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;file_delete&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;download&amp;#39;))
));
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Issue 2 — The top-level upload-right check loads the folder from the attacker-controlled URL parameter, not the file&amp;#39;s actual parent folder (lines 79–88):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if ($getMode != &amp;#39;list&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; $getMode != &amp;#39;download&amp;#39;) {
    $folder = new Folder($gDb);
    $folder-&amp;gt;getFol…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: admidio/admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated Admidio member with upload rights on **any one folder** can permanently delete files from folders where they have only view access. The authorization check at the top of `modules/documents-files.php` evaluates upload rights against the attacker-supplied `folder_uuid` URL parameter — not the file&amp;#39;s actual parent folder. The `file_delete` handler then only verifies view rights on the file&amp;#39;s real location, never upload rights. By passing a folder they legitimately own in `folder_uuid` while targeting a file in a restricted folder via `file_uuid`, an attacker bypasses the upload-right check entirely and permanently deletes the file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an **incomplete fix** of [GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f](https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f), which was patched in v5.0.7 but remains exploitable in v5.0.9.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected Version:** Admidio v5.0.9&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root Cause File:** `modules/documents-files.php`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Issue 1 — `folder_uuid` is not required for `file_delete` mode (line 67):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$getFolderUUID = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, &amp;#39;folder_uuid&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;uuid&amp;#39;, array(
    &amp;#39;requireValue&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; !in_array($getMode, array(&amp;#39;list&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;file_delete&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;download&amp;#39;))
));
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Issue 2 — The top-level upload-right check loads the folder from the attacker-controlled URL parameter, not the file&amp;#39;s actual parent folder (lines 79–88):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if ($getMode != &amp;#39;list&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; $getMode != &amp;#39;download&amp;#39;) {
    $folder = new Folder($gDb);
    $folder-&amp;gt;getFol…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qc4c-hrmc-4f78</guid>
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