https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 10:17:56 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47122 <p>Sparkle is a software update framework for macOS. In versions up to and including 2.9.1, `Autoupdate/AppInstaller.m`&#39;s `shouldAcceptNewConnection:` only enforces `SUCodeSigningVerifier validateConnection:` before stage 1 completes. After `_performedStage1Installation = YES`, new connections to the registered Mach service `&lt;bundleId&gt;-spki` are accepted from any local process without team-ID or code-signing checks. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available.</p> <p>Sparkle is a software update framework for macOS. In versions up to and including 2.9.1, `Autoupdate/AppInstaller.m`&#39;s `shouldAcceptNewConnection:` only enforces `SUCodeSigningVerifier validateConnection:` before stage 1 completes. After `_performedStage1Installation = YES`, new connections to the registered Mach service `&lt;bundleId&gt;-spki` are accepted from any local process without team-ID or code-signing checks. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47122 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g3hp-f6mg-559v <p><strong>Affected:</strong> SwiftURL: github.com/sparkle-project/Sparkle</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>AppInstaller post-stage-1 XPC listener accepts unvalidated connections, allowing spoofed appcast item data injection.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>`Autoupdate/AppInstaller.m`&#39;s `shouldAcceptNewConnection:` only enforces `SUCodeSigningVerifier validateConnection:` before stage 1 completes. After `_performedStage1Installation = YES`, new connections to the registered Mach service `&lt;bundleId&gt;-spki` are accepted from any local process without team-ID or code-signing checks.</p> <p>The following chain of events enables an attacker to inject a spoofed `SPUSentUpdateAppcastItemData` payload:</p> <p>1. Installer finishes unarchiving the update successfully (`_willCompleteInstallation` is set). 2. The app responsible for updating the bundle crashes or is forcefully quit before it has a chance to send `SPUSentUpdateAppcastItemData` to the installer. There is no user interaction between the prior step and this one, so the timing window is tight. 3. After stage 1 of the installer is performed (`_performedStage1Installation = YES`), but before final installation completes (since all services are cleaned up by then), an attacker process connects to the `&lt;bundleId&gt;-spki` Mach service - no code-signing validation is enforced - and sends a spoofed `SPUSentUpdateAppcastItemData` message containing an attacker-crafted `SUAppcastItem`. 4. A Sparkle-aware app that checks for updates on the bundle being updated launches before installation completes. The progress agent re-broadcasts the spoofed `SUAppcastItem` o…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> SwiftURL: github.com/sparkle-project/Sparkle</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>AppInstaller post-stage-1 XPC listener accepts unvalidated connections, allowing spoofed appcast item data injection.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>`Autoupdate/AppInstaller.m`&#39;s `shouldAcceptNewConnection:` only enforces `SUCodeSigningVerifier validateConnection:` before stage 1 completes. After `_performedStage1Installation = YES`, new connections to the registered Mach service `&lt;bundleId&gt;-spki` are accepted from any local process without team-ID or code-signing checks.</p> <p>The following chain of events enables an attacker to inject a spoofed `SPUSentUpdateAppcastItemData` payload:</p> <p>1. Installer finishes unarchiving the update successfully (`_willCompleteInstallation` is set). 2. The app responsible for updating the bundle crashes or is forcefully quit before it has a chance to send `SPUSentUpdateAppcastItemData` to the installer. There is no user interaction between the prior step and this one, so the timing window is tight. 3. After stage 1 of the installer is performed (`_performedStage1Installation = YES`), but before final installation completes (since all services are cleaned up by then), an attacker process connects to the `&lt;bundleId&gt;-spki` Mach service - no code-signing validation is enforced - and sends a spoofed `SPUSentUpdateAppcastItemData` message containing an attacker-crafted `SUAppcastItem`. 4. A Sparkle-aware app that checks for updates on the bundle being updated launches before installation completes. The progress agent re-broadcasts the spoofed `SUAppcastItem` o…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g3hp-f6mg-559v