fkie_cve-2026-47121

Sparkle is a software update framework for macOS. Prior to version 2.9.2, `Autoupdate/SUBinaryDeltaApply.m` enforces `relativePath.pathComponents containsObject:@".."` and rejects writes whose immediate parent directory IS itself a symbolic link, but does not detect symlinks deeper in the relative path. `Autoupdate/SPUSparkleDeltaArchive.m`'s `extractItem:` will create symlinks in the destination tree from archive content (no `..` check on the symlink target), and a subsequent `Extract` item targeting `<symlink>/foo/bar` then escapes the destination tree via `fopen(path, "wb")` because the kernel resolves the intermediate symlink during the open call. This is a defense-in-depth issue: exploitation requires a maliciously-crafted `.delta` that passes EdDSA signature verification, i.e. EdDSA private-key compromise. With the AppInstaller running as root for system-domain installs, it gives the holder of a stolen signing key arbitrary file write at root level via the delta-apply path, which is a strictly broader primitive than the "drop-in replacement bundle" install they would otherwise have. Version 2.9.2 contains a patch for the issue.

GHSA-hg88-v3cw-3qrh — Sparkle: Binary delta apply intermediate-symlink traversal in malicious .delta

Affected: SwiftURL: github.com/sparkle-project/Sparkle

## Summary

Binary delta apply intermediate-symlink traversal in malicious .delta

`Autoupdate/SUBinaryDeltaApply.m` enforces `relativePath.pathComponents containsObject:@".."` and rejects writes whose immediate parent directory IS itself a symbolic link, but does not detect symlinks deeper in the relative path. `Autoupdate/SPUSparkleDeltaArchive.m`'s `extractItem:` will create symlinks in the destination tree from archive content (no `..` check on the symlink target), and a subsequent `Extract` item targeting `<symlink>/foo/bar` then escapes the destination tree via `fopen(path, "wb")` because the kernel resolves the intermediate symlink during the open call.

This is a defense-in-depth issue: exploitation requires a maliciously-crafted `.delta` that passes EdDSA signature verification, i.e. EdDSA private-key compromise. With the AppInstaller running as root for system-domain installs, it gives the holder of a stolen signing key arbitrary file write at root level via the delta-apply path, which is a strictly broader primitive than the "drop-in replacement bundle" install they would otherwise have.

Affected versions: 1.x (master branch), 2.x branch including 2.9.1.

## Details

### Symlink writeable from archive

`Autoupdate/SPUSparkleDeltaArchive.m:557-678`'s `extractItem:` handles symlinks if the archive item carries `S_ISLNK(mode)`:

```objc } else { // Link files

if (PARTIAL_IO_CHUNK_SIZE < decodedLength) { ...too long... } if (decodedLength > PATH_MAX) { .…

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fkie_cve-2026-47121

GHSA-hg88-v3cw-3qrh — Sparkle: Binary delta apply intermediate-symlink traversal in malicious .delta