fkie_cve-2026-45720

Omni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. Prior to 1.6.6 and from 1.7.0 until 1.7.3, SAML.getSession in internal/pkg/auth/interceptor/saml.go checks SAMLAssertion.Used and marks it used in separate state operations. Concurrent requests carrying the same captured saml-session token can each observe the assertion as unused and obtain authentication as the victim before either update is visible. The attacker can invoke SAML-protected gRPC endpoints, use ConfirmPublicKey to create multiple persistent credentials tied to the victim, and generate audit entries attributed to the victim, with the resulting access potentially affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability according to the victim's privileges. This issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.

GHSA-5x9f-6vg5-qg4m — Omni has a TOCTOU race condition that allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use SAML session token

Affected: Go: github.com/siderolabs/omni

## Summary

`SAML.getSession` (`internal/pkg/auth/interceptor/saml.go`) checks the `Used` flag on a `SAMLAssertion` resource and then marks it used in two separate state operations. Because the check and the update are not atomic, concurrent requests carrying the same `saml-session` token can both observe `Used == false`, both pass validation, and both return a successful authentication context. An attacker who obtains a valid `saml-session` token can exploit this window to authenticate as the token's owner multiple times, defeating the one-time-use guarantee.

## Severity

- **Attack Vector:** Local: the attacker needs to either be able to intercept the local, unencrypted traffic or needs access to user's browser. - **Attack Complexity:** High: the attacker must first obtain a valid `saml-session` token belonging to the victim (requires a separate interception step; the token is ephemeral and single-use by design). - **Privileges Required:** None: no Omni account is required to carry out the race once the session token is in hand. - **User Interaction:** Required: the victim must initiate a SAML authentication flow to produce the session token that the attacker intercepts. - **Scope:** Unchanged: the impact stays within Omni's authorization boundary. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High: successful exploitation authenticates the attacker as the victim's email identity, granting read access to any resource accessible to that identity. - **Integrity Impact:** High: the attacker…

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fkie_cve-2026-45720

GHSA-5x9f-6vg5-qg4m — Omni has a TOCTOU race condition that allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use SAML session token