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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33764</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33764</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the AI plugin&amp;#39;s `save.json.php` endpoint loads AI response objects using an attacker-controlled `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;]` parameter without validating that the AI response belongs to the specified video. An authenticated user with AI permissions can reference any AI response ID — including those generated for other users&amp;#39; private videos — and apply the stolen AI-generated content (titles, descriptions, keywords, summaries, or full transcriptions) to their own video, effectively exfiltrating the information. Commit aa2c46a806960a0006105df47765913394eec142 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the AI plugin&amp;#39;s `save.json.php` endpoint loads AI response objects using an attacker-controlled `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;]` parameter without validating that the AI response belongs to the specified video. An authenticated user with AI permissions can reference any AI response ID — including those generated for other users&amp;#39; private videos — and apply the stolen AI-generated content (titles, descriptions, keywords, summaries, or full transcriptions) to their own video, effectively exfiltrating the information. Commit aa2c46a806960a0006105df47765913394eec142 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33764</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g39v-qrj6-jxrh — AVideo: IDOR in AI Plugin Allows Stealing Other Users' AI-Generated Metadata and Transcriptions</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g39v-qrj6-jxrh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The AI plugin&amp;#39;s `save.json.php` endpoint loads AI response objects using an attacker-controlled `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;]` parameter without validating that the AI response belongs to the specified video. An authenticated user with AI permissions can reference any AI response ID — including those generated for other users&amp;#39; private videos — and apply the stolen AI-generated content (titles, descriptions, keywords, summaries, or full transcriptions) to their own video, effectively exfiltrating the information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `plugin/AI/save.json.php`, the authorization flow checks that the user can edit the *target video* (`Video::canEdit($videos_id)` at line 23), but loads the AI response object from a completely separate, user-controlled parameter:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Line 29 — metatags path (no ownership check):**
```php
if(!empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;ai_metatags_responses_id&amp;#39;])){
    $ai = new Ai_metatags_responses($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;]);  // Loads ANY response by ID
    
    if (empty($ai-&amp;gt;getcompletion_tokens())) {
        forbiddenPage(&amp;#39;AI Response not found&amp;#39;);
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Line 146 — transcription path (no ownership check):**
```php
case &amp;#39;text&amp;#39;:
    if(!empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;ai_transcribe_responses_id&amp;#39;])){
        $ait = new Ai_transcribe_responses($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;]);  // Loads ANY response by ID
        $value = $ait-&amp;gt;getVtt();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `ObjectYPT` base class constructor performs a simple database lookup with no authorization:
```php
public function __construct($id = &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, $refreshCache = false) {
    i…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The AI plugin&amp;#39;s `save.json.php` endpoint loads AI response objects using an attacker-controlled `$_REQUEST[&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;]` parameter without validating that the AI response belongs to the specified video. An authenticated user with AI permissions can reference any AI response ID — including those generated for other users&amp;#39; private videos — and apply the stolen AI-generated content (titles, descriptions, keywords, summaries, or full transcriptions) to their own video, effectively exfiltrating the information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `plugin/AI/save.json.php`, the authorization flow checks that the user can edit the *target video* (`Video::canEdit($videos_id)` at line 23), but loads the AI response object from a completely separate, user-controlled parameter:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Line 29 — metatags path (no ownership check):**
```php
if(!empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;ai_metatags_responses_id&amp;#39;])){
    $ai = new Ai_metatags_responses($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;]);  // Loads ANY response by ID
    
    if (empty($ai-&amp;gt;getcompletion_tokens())) {
        forbiddenPage(&amp;#39;AI Response not found&amp;#39;);
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Line 146 — transcription path (no ownership check):**
```php
case &amp;#39;text&amp;#39;:
    if(!empty($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;ai_transcribe_responses_id&amp;#39;])){
        $ait = new Ai_transcribe_responses($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;]);  // Loads ANY response by ID
        $value = $ait-&amp;gt;getVtt();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `ObjectYPT` base class constructor performs a simple database lookup with no authorization:
```php
public function __construct($id = &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, $refreshCache = false) {
    i…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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