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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-11496</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-11496</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Woo PDF Invoice Builder plugin (also distributed as &amp;#34;PDF Builder for WooCommerce&amp;#34;) for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.8. This is due to the InspectOrder() AJAX handler (woocommerce-pdf-invoice-ajax.php:513), registered on wp_ajax_rednao_wcpdfinv_inspect_order, performing no capability check and no nonce verification before loading an arbitrary order by the attacker-supplied &amp;#39;OrderNumber&amp;#39; POST field and serializing its full WC_Order::get_data() and meta to the response. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to read every WooCommerce order on the site — including billing/shipping address, email, phone number, payment method, gateway transaction ID, and order totals — by iterating order IDs.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Woo PDF Invoice Builder plugin (also distributed as &amp;#34;PDF Builder for WooCommerce&amp;#34;) for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.8. This is due to the InspectOrder() AJAX handler (woocommerce-pdf-invoice-ajax.php:513), registered on wp_ajax_rednao_wcpdfinv_inspect_order, performing no capability check and no nonce verification before loading an arbitrary order by the attacker-supplied &amp;#39;OrderNumber&amp;#39; POST field and serializing its full WC_Order::get_data() and meta to the response. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to read every WooCommerce order on the site — including billing/shipping address, email, phone number, payment method, gateway transaction ID, and order totals — by iterating order IDs.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-qfqf-7g3v-cgr4</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qfqf-7g3v-cgr4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Woo PDF Invoice Builder plugin (also distributed as &amp;#34;PDF Builder for WooCommerce&amp;#34;) for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.8. This is due to the InspectOrder() AJAX handler (woocommerce-pdf-invoice-ajax.php:513), registered on wp_ajax_rednao_wcpdfinv_inspect_order, performing no capability check and no nonce verification before loading an arbitrary order by the attacker-supplied &amp;#39;OrderNumber&amp;#39; POST field and serializing its full WC_Order::get_data() and meta to the response. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to read every WooCommerce order on the site — including billing/shipping address, email, phone number, payment method, gateway transaction ID, and order totals — by iterating order IDs.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Woo PDF Invoice Builder plugin (also distributed as &amp;#34;PDF Builder for WooCommerce&amp;#34;) for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.8. This is due to the InspectOrder() AJAX handler (woocommerce-pdf-invoice-ajax.php:513), registered on wp_ajax_rednao_wcpdfinv_inspect_order, performing no capability check and no nonce verification before loading an arbitrary order by the attacker-supplied &amp;#39;OrderNumber&amp;#39; POST field and serializing its full WC_Order::get_data() and meta to the response. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to read every WooCommerce order on the site — including billing/shipping address, email, phone number, payment method, gateway transaction ID, and order totals — by iterating order IDs.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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