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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:34:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>BREW-oterm-CVE-2026-107295 — Pydantic AI Web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`): a website visited by the developer can trigger agent runs and s…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-oterm-cve-2026-107295</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: oterm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Pydantic AI development web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`) did not check the content type of requests to its chat endpoint. This allowed a website visited by a developer to submit a request to a chat UI running on that developer&amp;#39;s machine, causing the served agent to run and to execute its tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Binding the web UI to localhost — the default — does not prevent this, because a page open in the developer&amp;#39;s browser can reach the loopback address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications and developers serving an agent through `Agent.to_web()` or `clai web`. The consequences depend on the tools the served agent exposes, and can include data disclosure as well as unwanted tool side effects. Tools marked `requires_approval=True` were not protected either, because the endpoint trusts approval decisions relayed by the client.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to a patched version. The chat endpoint now requires `Content-Type: application/json` and rejects other requests before the request body is parsed and before the agent runs. The bundled chat UI already sends this header; scripts and other non-browser clients that call the endpoint directly may need to be updated to send it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you cannot upgrade, don&amp;#39;t run the web UI while browsing untrusted sites, stop it when you aren&amp;#39;t using it, and don&amp;#39;t serve an agent with side-effecting tools through it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&amp;amp;D)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: oterm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Pydantic AI development web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`) did not check the content type of requests to its chat endpoint. This allowed a website visited by a developer to submit a request to a chat UI running on that developer&amp;#39;s machine, causing the served agent to run and to execute its tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Binding the web UI to localhost — the default — does not prevent this, because a page open in the developer&amp;#39;s browser can reach the loopback address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications and developers serving an agent through `Agent.to_web()` or `clai web`. The consequences depend on the tools the served agent exposes, and can include data disclosure as well as unwanted tool side effects. Tools marked `requires_approval=True` were not protected either, because the endpoint trusts approval decisions relayed by the client.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to a patched version. The chat endpoint now requires `Content-Type: application/json` and rejects other requests before the request body is parsed and before the agent runs. The bundled chat UI already sends this header; scripts and other non-browser clients that call the endpoint directly may need to be updated to send it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you cannot upgrade, don&amp;#39;t run the web UI while browsing untrusted sites, stop it when you aren&amp;#39;t using it, and don&amp;#39;t serve an agent with side-effecting tools through it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&amp;amp;D)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-oterm-cve-2026-107295</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-107295</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107295</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building applications and workflows with Generative AI. From 1.34.0 until 1.107.4 and 2.28.0, the Agent.to_web() and clai web development chat endpoint has missing request content-type validation. A website visited by a developer can submit a browser-compatible request to a loopback-hosted chat server, causing the served agent to run and execute tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process; client-relayed approval decisions also leave requires_approval=True tools exposed. Binding to localhost does not prevent a browser page from reaching the loopback address. This issue is fixed in versions 1.107.4 and 2.28.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building applications and workflows with Generative AI. From 1.34.0 until 1.107.4 and 2.28.0, the Agent.to_web() and clai web development chat endpoint has missing request content-type validation. A website visited by a developer can submit a browser-compatible request to a loopback-hosted chat server, causing the served agent to run and execute tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process; client-relayed approval decisions also leave requires_approval=True tools exposed. Binding to localhost does not prevent a browser page from reaching the loopback address. This issue is fixed in versions 1.107.4 and 2.28.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107295</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h4xc-3qfq-jf93 — Pydantic AI Web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`): a website visited by the developer can trigger agent runs and s…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h4xc-3qfq-jf93</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pydantic-ai, PyPI: pydantic-ai-slim&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Pydantic AI development web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`) did not check the content type of requests to its chat endpoint. This allowed a website visited by a developer to submit a request to a chat UI running on that developer&amp;#39;s machine, causing the served agent to run and to execute its tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Binding the web UI to localhost — the default — does not prevent this, because a page open in the developer&amp;#39;s browser can reach the loopback address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications and developers serving an agent through `Agent.to_web()` or `clai web`. The consequences depend on the tools the served agent exposes, and can include data disclosure as well as unwanted tool side effects. Tools marked `requires_approval=True` were not protected either, because the endpoint trusts approval decisions relayed by the client.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to a patched version. The chat endpoint now requires `Content-Type: application/json` and rejects other requests before the request body is parsed and before the agent runs. The bundled chat UI already sends this header; scripts and other non-browser clients that call the endpoint directly may need to be updated to send it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you cannot upgrade, don&amp;#39;t run the web UI while browsing untrusted sites, stop it when you aren&amp;#39;t using it, and don&amp;#39;t serve an agent with side-effecting tools through it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&amp;amp;D)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pydantic-ai, PyPI: pydantic-ai-slim&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Pydantic AI development web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`) did not check the content type of requests to its chat endpoint. This allowed a website visited by a developer to submit a request to a chat UI running on that developer&amp;#39;s machine, causing the served agent to run and to execute its tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Binding the web UI to localhost — the default — does not prevent this, because a page open in the developer&amp;#39;s browser can reach the loopback address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications and developers serving an agent through `Agent.to_web()` or `clai web`. The consequences depend on the tools the served agent exposes, and can include data disclosure as well as unwanted tool side effects. Tools marked `requires_approval=True` were not protected either, because the endpoint trusts approval decisions relayed by the client.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to a patched version. The chat endpoint now requires `Content-Type: application/json` and rejects other requests before the request body is parsed and before the agent runs. The bundled chat UI already sends this header; scripts and other non-browser clients that call the endpoint directly may need to be updated to send it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you cannot upgrade, don&amp;#39;t run the web UI while browsing untrusted sites, stop it when you aren&amp;#39;t using it, and don&amp;#39;t serve an agent with side-effecting tools through it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&amp;amp;D)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h4xc-3qfq-jf93</guid>
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