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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>BREW-oterm-CVE-2026-107292 — Pydantic AI Web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`): the local chat endpoint does not validate the `Host` header</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-oterm-cve-2026-107292</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: oterm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Pydantic AI development web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`) does not validate the `Host` header of incoming requests. A website a developer visits can use DNS rebinding to make requests to a chat UI running on that developer&amp;#39;s machine appear same-origin to the browser, causing the served agent to run and to execute its tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once a name the attacker controls resolves to the loopback address, the browser treats the request as same-origin, so neither an `Origin` check nor a CSRF token constrains it — a same-origin page can read the served UI and any token in it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Binding the web UI to localhost — the default — does not prevent this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications and developers serving an agent through `Agent.to_web()` or `clai web`. The consequences depend on the tools the served agent exposes, and can include data disclosure as well as unwanted tool side effects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Current browser protections reduce but do not remove this exposure: Chromium&amp;#39;s Local Network Access gates loopback subresource requests, but does not cover top-level navigations, and Safari does not implement it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to `pydantic-ai`/`pydantic-ai-slim` &amp;gt;= 2.30.0, or &amp;gt;= 1.107.5 on the v1 maintenance line.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates the `Host` header and rejects anything other than localhost, a loopback/LAN IP address, or an explicitly allowed host, responding `421 Misdirected Request` otherwise. If you serve the w…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: oterm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Pydantic AI development web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`) does not validate the `Host` header of incoming requests. A website a developer visits can use DNS rebinding to make requests to a chat UI running on that developer&amp;#39;s machine appear same-origin to the browser, causing the served agent to run and to execute its tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once a name the attacker controls resolves to the loopback address, the browser treats the request as same-origin, so neither an `Origin` check nor a CSRF token constrains it — a same-origin page can read the served UI and any token in it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Binding the web UI to localhost — the default — does not prevent this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications and developers serving an agent through `Agent.to_web()` or `clai web`. The consequences depend on the tools the served agent exposes, and can include data disclosure as well as unwanted tool side effects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Current browser protections reduce but do not remove this exposure: Chromium&amp;#39;s Local Network Access gates loopback subresource requests, but does not cover top-level navigations, and Safari does not implement it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to `pydantic-ai`/`pydantic-ai-slim` &amp;gt;= 2.30.0, or &amp;gt;= 1.107.5 on the v1 maintenance line.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates the `Host` header and rejects anything other than localhost, a loopback/LAN IP address, or an explicitly allowed host, responding `421 Misdirected Request` otherwise. If you serve the w…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-oterm-cve-2026-107292</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-107292</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107292</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building applications and workflows with Generative AI. From 1.34.0 until 2.30.0, the Agent.to_web() and clai web development chat server does not validate the Host header, allowing a website visited by a developer to use DNS rebinding to reach a loopback-hosted agent as a same-origin service. The hostile page can read the served UI and submit chat requests that execute agent tools with the local process&amp;#39;s privileges and credentials, causing data disclosure or unwanted side effects. Binding to localhost, Origin checks, and CSRF tokens do not prevent the same-origin DNS rebinding path. This issue is fixed in versions 1.107.5 and 2.30.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building applications and workflows with Generative AI. From 1.34.0 until 2.30.0, the Agent.to_web() and clai web development chat server does not validate the Host header, allowing a website visited by a developer to use DNS rebinding to reach a loopback-hosted agent as a same-origin service. The hostile page can read the served UI and submit chat requests that execute agent tools with the local process&amp;#39;s privileges and credentials, causing data disclosure or unwanted side effects. Binding to localhost, Origin checks, and CSRF tokens do not prevent the same-origin DNS rebinding path. This issue is fixed in versions 1.107.5 and 2.30.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107292</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-q2xc-rrxj-58x9 — Pydantic AI Web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`): the local chat endpoint does not validate the `Host` header</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-q2xc-rrxj-58x9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pydantic-ai, PyPI: pydantic-ai-slim&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Pydantic AI development web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`) does not validate the `Host` header of incoming requests. A website a developer visits can use DNS rebinding to make requests to a chat UI running on that developer&amp;#39;s machine appear same-origin to the browser, causing the served agent to run and to execute its tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once a name the attacker controls resolves to the loopback address, the browser treats the request as same-origin, so neither an `Origin` check nor a CSRF token constrains it — a same-origin page can read the served UI and any token in it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Binding the web UI to localhost — the default — does not prevent this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications and developers serving an agent through `Agent.to_web()` or `clai web`. The consequences depend on the tools the served agent exposes, and can include data disclosure as well as unwanted tool side effects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Current browser protections reduce but do not remove this exposure: Chromium&amp;#39;s Local Network Access gates loopback subresource requests, but does not cover top-level navigations, and Safari does not implement it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to `pydantic-ai`/`pydantic-ai-slim` &amp;gt;= 2.30.0, or &amp;gt;= 1.107.5 on the v1 maintenance line.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates the `Host` header and rejects anything other than localhost, a loopback/LAN IP address, or an explicitly allowed host, responding `421 Misdirected Request` otherwise. If you serve the w…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pydantic-ai, PyPI: pydantic-ai-slim&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Pydantic AI development web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`) does not validate the `Host` header of incoming requests. A website a developer visits can use DNS rebinding to make requests to a chat UI running on that developer&amp;#39;s machine appear same-origin to the browser, causing the served agent to run and to execute its tools with the privileges and credentials of the local process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once a name the attacker controls resolves to the loopback address, the browser treats the request as same-origin, so neither an `Origin` check nor a CSRF token constrains it — a same-origin page can read the served UI and any token in it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Binding the web UI to localhost — the default — does not prevent this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications and developers serving an agent through `Agent.to_web()` or `clai web`. The consequences depend on the tools the served agent exposes, and can include data disclosure as well as unwanted tool side effects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Current browser protections reduce but do not remove this exposure: Chromium&amp;#39;s Local Network Access gates loopback subresource requests, but does not cover top-level navigations, and Safari does not implement it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to `pydantic-ai`/`pydantic-ai-slim` &amp;gt;= 2.30.0, or &amp;gt;= 1.107.5 on the v1 maintenance line.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates the `Host` header and rejects anything other than localhost, a loopback/LAN IP address, or an explicitly allowed host, responding `421 Misdirected Request` otherwise. If you serve the w…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-q2xc-rrxj-58x9</guid>
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