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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-100370</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100370</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;DOMSanitizer is a DOM/SVG/MathML Sanitizer for PHP 7.3+. Prior to version 1.0.15, the isDangerousUrl() method is responsible for rejecting dangerous URL values in the href and xlink:href attributes. The weakness is that &amp;#34;javascript:&amp;#34; is rejected as a scheme, while &amp;#34;data:&amp;#34; is rejected only when the literal substring onload appears in the URL value (/^data:.*onload/i). Because data: payloads are routinely Base64-encoded, the dangerous content (&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;, event handlers, etc.) is invisible to that substring test. A URL such as data:text/html;base64,… therefore survives in href / xlink:href, even though the decoded payload is active markup. This is an incomplete input-validation / sanitization defect in the sanitizer itself. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.15.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;DOMSanitizer is a DOM/SVG/MathML Sanitizer for PHP 7.3+. Prior to version 1.0.15, the isDangerousUrl() method is responsible for rejecting dangerous URL values in the href and xlink:href attributes. The weakness is that &amp;#34;javascript:&amp;#34; is rejected as a scheme, while &amp;#34;data:&amp;#34; is rejected only when the literal substring onload appears in the URL value (/^data:.*onload/i). Because data: payloads are routinely Base64-encoded, the dangerous content (&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;, event handlers, etc.) is invisible to that substring test. A URL such as data:text/html;base64,… therefore survives in href / xlink:href, even though the decoded payload is active markup. This is an incomplete input-validation / sanitization defect in the sanitizer itself. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.15.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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