<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 22:04:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2024-13942</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-13942</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Secure BootROM of RK3588s SoC is vulnerable to a time-of-check to time-of-use attack in case of booting from external media (SPI NOR or NAND, EMMC or SD).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code reads the header of the next-stage loader twice. The header contains hashes of the executable modules and is signed with a private key, the public part of which is verified against the SHA256 digest blown in the OTP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first read is only partial and contains only the hashes of the executable modules. The second is complete, including the header signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although the header is verified based on the fully read data, the authenticity of the executable modules is checked against the partial data from the first read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with physical access to a device containing RK3588s SoC can easily modify the next-stage loader data on-the-fly using a low-cost SD-card or SPI NOR/NAND or EMMC emulator. Even a simple ultra low-cost circuit comprising two memory chips (containing the same data but different headers - the original and the modified one) and a multiplexer can be used to carry out an attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to arbitrary code execution with the highest privileges available (EL3). This issue affects RK3588s: RK3588s SoC BootROM (secure) 350B20210512V100 and possibly others.
As remediation apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable  https://www.rock-chips.com/a/en/products/RK35_Series/2022/0926/1660.html&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Secure BootROM of RK3588s SoC is vulnerable to a time-of-check to time-of-use attack in case of booting from external media (SPI NOR or NAND, EMMC or SD).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code reads the header of the next-stage loader twice. The header contains hashes of the executable modules and is signed with a private key, the public part of which is verified against the SHA256 digest blown in the OTP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first read is only partial and contains only the hashes of the executable modules. The second is complete, including the header signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although the header is verified based on the fully read data, the authenticity of the executable modules is checked against the partial data from the first read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with physical access to a device containing RK3588s SoC can easily modify the next-stage loader data on-the-fly using a low-cost SD-card or SPI NOR/NAND or EMMC emulator. Even a simple ultra low-cost circuit comprising two memory chips (containing the same data but different headers - the original and the modified one) and a multiplexer can be used to carry out an attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to arbitrary code execution with the highest privileges available (EL3). This issue affects RK3588s: RK3588s SoC BootROM (secure) 350B20210512V100 and possibly others.
As remediation apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable  https://www.rock-chips.com/a/en/products/RK35_Series/2022/0926/1660.html&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-13942</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xpxw-ff9m-vh66</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xpxw-ff9m-vh66</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Secure BootROM of RK3588s SoC is vulnerable to a time-of-check to time-of-use attack in case of booting from external media (SPI NOR or NAND, EMMC or SD).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code reads the header of the next-stage loader twice. The header contains hashes of the executable modules and is signed with a private key, the public part of which is verified against the SHA256 digest blown in the OTP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first read is only partial and contains only the hashes of the executable modules. The second is complete, including the header signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although the header is verified based on the fully read data, the authenticity of the executable modules is checked against the partial data from the first read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with physical access to a device containing RK3588s SoC can easily modify the next-stage loader data on-the-fly using a low-cost SD-card or SPI NOR/NAND or EMMC emulator. Even a simple ultra low-cost circuit comprising two memory chips (containing the same data but different headers - the original and the modified one) and a multiplexer can be used to carry out an attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to arbitrary code execution with the highest privileges available (EL3). This issue affects RK3588s: RK3588s SoC BootROM (secure) 350B20210512V100 and possibly others.
As remediation apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable  https://www.rock-chips.com/a/en/products/RK35_Series/2022/0926/1660.html&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Secure BootROM of RK3588s SoC is vulnerable to a time-of-check to time-of-use attack in case of booting from external media (SPI NOR or NAND, EMMC or SD).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code reads the header of the next-stage loader twice. The header contains hashes of the executable modules and is signed with a private key, the public part of which is verified against the SHA256 digest blown in the OTP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first read is only partial and contains only the hashes of the executable modules. The second is complete, including the header signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although the header is verified based on the fully read data, the authenticity of the executable modules is checked against the partial data from the first read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with physical access to a device containing RK3588s SoC can easily modify the next-stage loader data on-the-fly using a low-cost SD-card or SPI NOR/NAND or EMMC emulator. Even a simple ultra low-cost circuit comprising two memory chips (containing the same data but different headers - the original and the modified one) and a multiplexer can be used to carry out an attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to arbitrary code execution with the highest privileges available (EL3). This issue affects RK3588s: RK3588s SoC BootROM (secure) 350B20210512V100 and possibly others.
As remediation apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable  https://www.rock-chips.com/a/en/products/RK35_Series/2022/0926/1660.html&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xpxw-ff9m-vh66</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
