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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 07:10:05 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CERTFR-2025-AVI-0307 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de SUSE. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un at…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CERTFR-2025-AVI-0307</link>
      <description>CERTFR-2025-AVI-0307</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CERTFR-2025-AVI-0307</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2025-06339</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2025-06339</link>
      <description>bdu:2025-06339</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2025-06339</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2023-53024</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2023-53024</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2023-53024</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2023-53024</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-53024</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca (&amp;#34;bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&amp;#34;) inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[...]
  // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
  // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
  // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
  //
  r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
  *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
  // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
  //
  // O…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca (&amp;#34;bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&amp;#34;) inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[...]
  // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
  // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
  // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
  //
  r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
  *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
  // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
  //
  // O…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-53024</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mqh3-5x68-9v64</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mqh3-5x68-9v64</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca (&amp;#34;bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&amp;#34;) inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[...]
  // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
  // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
  // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
  //
  r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
  *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
  // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
  //
  // O…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca (&amp;#34;bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&amp;#34;) inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[...]
  // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
  // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
  // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
  //
  r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
  *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
  // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
  //
  // O…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mqh3-5x68-9v64</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2025-1408 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2025-1408</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc: nci: add flush_workqueue to prevent uaf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Our detector found a concurrent use-after-free bug when detaching an
NCI device. The main reason for this bug is the unexpected scheduling
between the used delayed mechanism (timer and workqueue).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The race can be demonstrated below:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thread-1                           Thread-2
                                 | nci_dev_up()
                                 |   nci_open_device()
                                 |     __nci_request(nci_reset_req)
                                 |       nci_send_cmd
                                 |         queue_work(cmd_work)
nci_unregister_device()          |
  nci_close_device()             | ...
    del_timer_sync(cmd_timer)[1] |
...                              | Worker
nci_free_device()                | nci_cmd_work()
  kfree(ndev)[3]                 |   mod_timer(cmd_timer)[2]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In short, the cleanup routine thought that the cmd_timer has already
been detached by [1] but the mod_timer can re-attach the timer [2], even
it is already released [3], resulting in UAF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This UAF is easy to trigger, crash trace by POC is like below&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[   66.703713] ==================================================================
[   66.703974] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in enqueue_timer+0x448/0x490
[   66.703974] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888009fb7058 by task kworker/u4…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc: nci: add flush_workqueue to prevent uaf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Our detector found a concurrent use-after-free bug when detaching an
NCI device. The main reason for this bug is the unexpected scheduling
between the used delayed mechanism (timer and workqueue).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The race can be demonstrated below:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thread-1                           Thread-2
                                 | nci_dev_up()
                                 |   nci_open_device()
                                 |     __nci_request(nci_reset_req)
                                 |       nci_send_cmd
                                 |         queue_work(cmd_work)
nci_unregister_device()          |
  nci_close_device()             | ...
    del_timer_sync(cmd_timer)[1] |
...                              | Worker
nci_free_device()                | nci_cmd_work()
  kfree(ndev)[3]                 |   mod_timer(cmd_timer)[2]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In short, the cleanup routine thought that the cmd_timer has already
been detached by [1] but the mod_timer can re-attach the timer [2], even
it is already released [3], resulting in UAF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This UAF is easy to trigger, crash trace by POC is like below&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[   66.703713] ==================================================================
[   66.703974] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in enqueue_timer+0x448/0x490
[   66.703974] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888009fb7058 by task kworker/u4…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2025-1408</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2023:6583 — Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security, bug fix, and enhancement update</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2023:6583</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel: seg6: fix the iif in the IPv6 socket control block Kernel: race when faulting a device private page in memory manager kernel: use-after-free in l1oip timer handlers kernel: Rate limit overflow messages in r8152 in intr_callback kernel: vmwgfx: use-after-free in vmw_cmd_res_check kernel: vmwgfx: use-after-free in vmw_execbuf_tie_context hw: Intel: Gather Data Sampling (GDS) side channel vulnerability kernel: Information leak in l2cap_parse_conf_req in net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c kernel: perf: Fix perf_pending_task() UaF kernel: gpiolib: fix memory leak in gpiochip_setup_dev() kernel: memcg: fix possible use-after-free in memcg_write_event_control() kernel: mm/khugepaged: invoke MMU notifiers in shmem/file collapse paths kernel: char: tpm: Protect tpm_pm_suspend with locks kernel: ixgbevf: Fix resource leak in ixgbevf_init_module() kernel: dax: make sure inodes are flushed before destroy cache kernel: watch_queue: Actually free the watch kernel: watch_queue: Fix NULL dereference in error cleanup kernel: rtc: pl031: fix rtc features null pointer dereference kernel: tpm: fix reference counting for struct tpm_chip kernel: NFSv4: Don&amp;#39;t hold the layoutget locks across multiple RPC calls kernel: xprtrdma: treat all calls not a bcall when bc_serv is NULL kernel: net: ipv6: unexport __init-annotated seg6_hmac_init() kernel: af_unix: Fix a data-race in unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(). kernel: regulator: scmi: Fix refcount leak in scmi_regulator_probe kernel: mm/mempolicy: fix uninit-v…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel: seg6: fix the iif in the IPv6 socket control block Kernel: race when faulting a device private page in memory manager kernel: use-after-free in l1oip timer handlers kernel: Rate limit overflow messages in r8152 in intr_callback kernel: vmwgfx: use-after-free in vmw_cmd_res_check kernel: vmwgfx: use-after-free in vmw_execbuf_tie_context hw: Intel: Gather Data Sampling (GDS) side channel vulnerability kernel: Information leak in l2cap_parse_conf_req in net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c kernel: perf: Fix perf_pending_task() UaF kernel: gpiolib: fix memory leak in gpiochip_setup_dev() kernel: memcg: fix possible use-after-free in memcg_write_event_control() kernel: mm/khugepaged: invoke MMU notifiers in shmem/file collapse paths kernel: char: tpm: Protect tpm_pm_suspend with locks kernel: ixgbevf: Fix resource leak in ixgbevf_init_module() kernel: dax: make sure inodes are flushed before destroy cache kernel: watch_queue: Actually free the watch kernel: watch_queue: Fix NULL dereference in error cleanup kernel: rtc: pl031: fix rtc features null pointer dereference kernel: tpm: fix reference counting for struct tpm_chip kernel: NFSv4: Don&amp;#39;t hold the layoutget locks across multiple RPC calls kernel: xprtrdma: treat all calls not a bcall when bc_serv is NULL kernel: net: ipv6: unexport __init-annotated seg6_hmac_init() kernel: af_unix: Fix a data-race in unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(). kernel: regulator: scmi: Fix refcount leak in scmi_regulator_probe kernel: mm/mempolicy: fix uninit-v…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2023:6583</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2025:1176-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2025:1176-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2025:1176-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2023-53024</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-53024</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-hwe-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-ibm-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-oracle-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-raspi-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3 and 117 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca (&amp;#34;bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&amp;#34;) inserts lfence instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a pointer to the stack. However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using, for example, a branch-based cache side channel. To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small. The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit and the mitigation:   [...]   // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)   // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel   // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked   //   r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb   *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked   // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.   //   // Ommitte…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-hwe-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-ibm-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-oracle-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-raspi-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3 and 117 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca (&amp;#34;bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation&amp;#34;) inserts lfence instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a pointer to the stack. However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using, for example, a branch-based cache side channel. To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small. The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit and the mitigation:   [...]   // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)   // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel   // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked   //   r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb   *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked   // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.   //   // Ommitte…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-53024</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-0649 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-0649</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder nicht spezifizierte Effekte zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder nicht spezifizierte Effekte zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-0649</guid>
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