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      <title>CVE-2026-82397 — Tornado: Urlencoded body parsing omits max_num_fields, so one request can stall the event loop</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-82397</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; tornadoweb tornado&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.8, Tornado parses application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies with urllib.parse.parse_qs in tornado/escape.py without passing max_num_fields. RequestHandler._execute in tornado/web.py parses the body before handler dispatch through HTTPServerRequest._parse_body and parse_body_arguments in tornado/httputil.py, so an unauthenticated request body containing millions of separator-delimited fields can synchronously stall the single-threaded event loop and delay every connection. The body is bounded only by max_buffer_size, which defaults to 104857600 bytes. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; tornadoweb tornado&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.8, Tornado parses application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies with urllib.parse.parse_qs in tornado/escape.py without passing max_num_fields. RequestHandler._execute in tornado/web.py parses the body before handler dispatch through HTTPServerRequest._parse_body and parse_body_arguments in tornado/httputil.py, so an unauthenticated request body containing millions of separator-delimited fields can synchronously stall the single-threaded event loop and delay every connection. The body is bounded only by max_buffer_size, which defaults to 104857600 bytes. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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