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      <title>GHSA-j7c9-79x7-8hpr — step-ca Has Improper Authorization Check for SSH Certificate Revocation</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-j7c9-79x7-8hpr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/smallstep/certificates&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
An authorized attacker can bypass authorization checks and revoke any SSH certificate issued by Step CA by using a valid revocation token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
Step CA users can obtain SSH certificates from a few provisioners. The SSHPOP provisioner allows revocation of the SSH certificate (preventing future certificate renewals) using a token. Due to a missing validity check, this token could be used to revoke any SSH certificate issued by the CA.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To create a token, an attacker must have access to the CA endpoint and a valid SSH certificate, meaning they were already authorized to obtain an SSH certificate. The attacker must also know the serial number of the certificate they want to revoke.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
There is no way to mitigate this attack. It is recommended to update to v0.29.0 or newer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
In v0.29.0, the token validation logic was strengthened to bind each token to a specific SSH certificate serial number.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Acknowledgements
This issue was identified and reported by Gabriel Departout and Andy Russon, from [AMOSSYS](http://amossys.fr/). This audit was sponsored by [ANSSI](https://cyber.gouv.fr/) (French Cybersecurity Agency) based on [their Open-Source security audit program](https://cyber.gouv.fr/open-source-lanssi#:~:text=Financement%20d%27%C3%A9valuations%20de%20s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9%20de%20logiciels%20libres).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Embargo List&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If your organization runs Step CA in production and would like advance, embargoed notification of future security updates, visit http…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/smallstep/certificates&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
An authorized attacker can bypass authorization checks and revoke any SSH certificate issued by Step CA by using a valid revocation token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
Step CA users can obtain SSH certificates from a few provisioners. The SSHPOP provisioner allows revocation of the SSH certificate (preventing future certificate renewals) using a token. Due to a missing validity check, this token could be used to revoke any SSH certificate issued by the CA.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To create a token, an attacker must have access to the CA endpoint and a valid SSH certificate, meaning they were already authorized to obtain an SSH certificate. The attacker must also know the serial number of the certificate they want to revoke.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
There is no way to mitigate this attack. It is recommended to update to v0.29.0 or newer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
In v0.29.0, the token validation logic was strengthened to bind each token to a specific SSH certificate serial number.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Acknowledgements
This issue was identified and reported by Gabriel Departout and Andy Russon, from [AMOSSYS](http://amossys.fr/). This audit was sponsored by [ANSSI](https://cyber.gouv.fr/) (French Cybersecurity Agency) based on [their Open-Source security audit program](https://cyber.gouv.fr/open-source-lanssi#:~:text=Financement%20d%27%C3%A9valuations%20de%20s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9%20de%20logiciels%20libres).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Embargo List&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If your organization runs Step CA in production and would like advance, embargoed notification of future security updates, visit http…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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