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      <title>CVE-2026-44898 — Mistune TOC Anchor Injection XSS</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44898</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; lepture mistune&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.2.1, render_toc_ul() builds a &amp;lt;ul&amp;gt; table-of-contents tree from a list of (level, id, text) tuples. Both the id value (used as href=&amp;#34;#&amp;lt;id&amp;gt;&amp;#34;) and the text value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into &amp;lt;a&amp;gt; tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value. When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the href=&amp;#34;#...&amp;#34; attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; blocks directly into the rendered TOC. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; lepture mistune&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.2.1, render_toc_ul() builds a &amp;lt;ul&amp;gt; table-of-contents tree from a list of (level, id, text) tuples. Both the id value (used as href=&amp;#34;#&amp;lt;id&amp;gt;&amp;#34;) and the text value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into &amp;lt;a&amp;gt; tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value. When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the href=&amp;#34;#...&amp;#34; attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; blocks directly into the rendered TOC. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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