https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 07:18:56 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gr75-jv2w-4656 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langchain, PyPI: langchain-anthropic</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>Several LangChain components that resolve filesystem paths or expand search patterns do not consistently confine the *resolved* path to the intended root directory. Affected behaviors include: a file-search agent middleware that validates a starting directory but not the search pattern or the resolved target of matched files, so glob patterns and symlinks can reach files outside the configured root; prompt- and chain/agent-configuration loaders that accept path fields and resolve them without confining the result to a trusted base or rejecting symlink targets; and path-prefix authorization checks that compare by string prefix without a path-segment boundary, so a sibling path sharing the prefix is accepted. When these components receive path values, search patterns, or workspace contents influenced by an untrusted source — including an LLM acting on untrusted input — the result can be disclosure of files outside the intended boundary. We have no evidence of this behavior being triggered in the wild.</p> <p>## Affected users / systems</p> <p>You may be affected if you expose an agent with filesystem-search middleware over a directory and accept prompts or retrieved content influenced by untrusted sources; load prompt or chain/agent configuration from untrusted or shared sources; or rely on path-prefix restrictions to confine tool file access. Callers that confine these components to fully trusted inputs and first-party configuration are not affected.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>- Confidentia…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langchain, PyPI: langchain-anthropic</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>Several LangChain components that resolve filesystem paths or expand search patterns do not consistently confine the *resolved* path to the intended root directory. Affected behaviors include: a file-search agent middleware that validates a starting directory but not the search pattern or the resolved target of matched files, so glob patterns and symlinks can reach files outside the configured root; prompt- and chain/agent-configuration loaders that accept path fields and resolve them without confining the result to a trusted base or rejecting symlink targets; and path-prefix authorization checks that compare by string prefix without a path-segment boundary, so a sibling path sharing the prefix is accepted. When these components receive path values, search patterns, or workspace contents influenced by an untrusted source — including an LLM acting on untrusted input — the result can be disclosure of files outside the intended boundary. We have no evidence of this behavior being triggered in the wild.</p> <p>## Affected users / systems</p> <p>You may be affected if you expose an agent with filesystem-search middleware over a directory and accept prompts or retrieved content influenced by untrusted sources; load prompt or chain/agent configuration from untrusted or shared sources; or rely on path-prefix restrictions to confine tool file access. Callers that confine these components to fully trusted inputs and first-party configuration are not affected.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>- Confidentia…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gr75-jv2w-4656