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      <title>CVE-2026-47065 — Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47065</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Apache Software Foundation Apache MINA&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Assessment: Fully addressed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker 
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
 is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default 
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which 
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH 
interface name and constructs the proxy class â€” bypassing the accepted
 classes list .&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in 
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Assessment: Fully addressed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s 
 (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an 
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the 
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*&amp;#34;) , attacker supplies 
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes &amp;lt;clinit&amp;gt; of SomeClass â€” and many 
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both issues have been fixed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Apache Software Foundation Apache MINA&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Assessment: Fully addressed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker 
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
 is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default 
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which 
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH 
interface name and constructs the proxy class â€” bypassing the accepted
 classes list .&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in 
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Assessment: Fully addressed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s 
 (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an 
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the 
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*&amp;#34;) , attacker supplies 
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes &amp;lt;clinit&amp;gt; of SomeClass â€” and many 
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both issues have been fixed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47065</guid>
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