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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2023-28452</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2023-28452</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;An issue was discovered in CoreDNS through 1.10.1. There is a vulnerability in DNS resolving software, which triggers a resolver to ignore valid responses, thus causing denial of service for normal resolution. In an exploit, the attacker could just forge a response targeting the source port of a vulnerable resolver without the need to guess the correct TXID.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;An issue was discovered in CoreDNS through 1.10.1. There is a vulnerability in DNS resolving software, which triggers a resolver to ignore valid responses, thus causing denial of service for normal resolution. In an exploit, the attacker could just forge a response targeting the source port of a vulnerable resolver without the need to guess the correct TXID.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2023-28452</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2wpx-qpw2-g5h5 — CoreDNS' DoQ worker pool does not bound stream backlog</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2wpx-qpw2-g5h5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/coredns/coredns&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
CoreDNS&amp;#39; DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) server can be driven into large goroutine and memory growth by a remote client that opens many QUIC streams and stalls after sending only 1 byte. Even with a small configured quic { worker_pool_size ... }, CoreDNS still spawns a goroutine per accepted stream (workers + waiters) and active workers can block indefinitely in io.ReadFull() with no per-stream read deadline, enabling unauthenticated remote DoS via memory exhaustion/OOM-kill.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
CoreDNS&amp;#39; DoQ server uses a global worker pool (streamProcessPool) to limit concurrent stream processing, but when the pool is full it still spawns a goroutine per accepted stream that waits to acquire a worker token: select { case s.streamProcessPool &amp;lt;- ...: go ...; default: go ... wait for token ... } (core/dnsserver/server_quic.go)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the DoQ message framing reads are blocking io.ReadFull() calls with no per-stream read deadline: readDOQMessage() reads the 2-byte length prefix and message body via io.ReadFull() (core/dnsserver/server_quic.go)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows an attacker to pin all workers by sending 1 byte (so io.ReadFull() blocks waiting for the second byte of the DoQ length prefix), while also creating an unbounded backlog of goroutines waiting for a worker token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: this appears to be a result of an incomplete fix/regression for CVE-2025-47950 (GHSA-cvx7-x8pj-x2gw).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
1. Adjust COREDNS_BIN in the PoC to point at right path (see the top-level const definitions for tu…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/coredns/coredns&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
CoreDNS&amp;#39; DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) server can be driven into large goroutine and memory growth by a remote client that opens many QUIC streams and stalls after sending only 1 byte. Even with a small configured quic { worker_pool_size ... }, CoreDNS still spawns a goroutine per accepted stream (workers + waiters) and active workers can block indefinitely in io.ReadFull() with no per-stream read deadline, enabling unauthenticated remote DoS via memory exhaustion/OOM-kill.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
CoreDNS&amp;#39; DoQ server uses a global worker pool (streamProcessPool) to limit concurrent stream processing, but when the pool is full it still spawns a goroutine per accepted stream that waits to acquire a worker token: select { case s.streamProcessPool &amp;lt;- ...: go ...; default: go ... wait for token ... } (core/dnsserver/server_quic.go)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the DoQ message framing reads are blocking io.ReadFull() calls with no per-stream read deadline: readDOQMessage() reads the 2-byte length prefix and message body via io.ReadFull() (core/dnsserver/server_quic.go)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows an attacker to pin all workers by sending 1 byte (so io.ReadFull() blocks waiting for the second byte of the DoQ length prefix), while also creating an unbounded backlog of goroutines waiting for a worker token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: this appears to be a result of an incomplete fix/regression for CVE-2025-47950 (GHSA-cvx7-x8pj-x2gw).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
1. Adjust COREDNS_BIN in the PoC to point at right path (see the top-level const definitions for tu…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2wpx-qpw2-g5h5</guid>
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