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      <title>CVE-2026-62949 — AsyncSSH: asyncio event-loop freeze via SSH maximum packet size = 0 in SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN / OPEN_CONFIRMATION</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-62949</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ronf asyncssh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AsyncSSH is a Python package which provides an asynchronous client and server implementation of the SSHv2 protocol on top of the Python asyncio framework. Prior to 2.24.0, _process_channel_open and _process_channel_open_confirmation in asyncssh/connection.py accept a peer-supplied send_pktsize value of zero. When channel data reaches SSHChannel._flush_send_buf in asyncssh/channel.py, the zero value causes each loop iteration to slice and remove zero bytes without reducing the send window, leaving the synchronous loop permanently true with no await point. A malicious SSH server can trigger the client path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION before the first channel write, while an authenticated client can trigger the server path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and freeze every current and future connection handled by the process. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.24.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ronf asyncssh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AsyncSSH is a Python package which provides an asynchronous client and server implementation of the SSHv2 protocol on top of the Python asyncio framework. Prior to 2.24.0, _process_channel_open and _process_channel_open_confirmation in asyncssh/connection.py accept a peer-supplied send_pktsize value of zero. When channel data reaches SSHChannel._flush_send_buf in asyncssh/channel.py, the zero value causes each loop iteration to slice and remove zero bytes without reducing the send window, leaving the synchronous loop permanently true with no await point. A malicious SSH server can trigger the client path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION before the first channel write, while an authenticated client can trigger the server path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and freeze every current and future connection handled by the process. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.24.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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