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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 10:47:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-75595 — Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-75595</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; netty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route&amp;#39;s mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; netty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route&amp;#39;s mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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