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      <title>GHSA-2c5c-chwr-9hqw — Netty HTTP/3 QPACK literal unbounded allocation</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2c5c-chwr-9hqw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When Netty decodes HTTP/3 headers, it sometimes runs `new byte[length]` using a length from the wire before checking that many bytes are really there. A small malicious header can claim a huge length (on the order of a gigabyte).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
When decoding header blocks, the non-Huffman branch of `io.netty.handler.codec.http3.QpackDecoder#decodeHuffmanEncodedLiteral` may execute `new byte[length]` for a string literal before verifying that length bytes are actually present in the compressed field section. The wire encoding allows a very large length to be expressed in few bytes. There is no check that `length &amp;lt;= in.readableBytes()` before `new byte[length]`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The test below constructs a small HTTP/3 HEADERS frame whose QPACK section decodes to a ~1 GiB non-Huffman name length and is used to observe server-side failure; it illustrates how little wire data can target `new byte[length]`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
    @Test
    public void test() throws Exception {
        EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(1, NioIoHandler.newFactory());
        try {
            X509Bundle cert = new CertificateBuilder()
                    .subject(&amp;#34;cn=localhost&amp;#34;)
                    .setIsCertificateAuthority(true)
                    .buildSelfSigned();&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;QuicSslContext serverContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forServer(cert.toTempPrivateKeyPem(), null, cert.toTempCertChainPem())
                    .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When Netty decodes HTTP/3 headers, it sometimes runs `new byte[length]` using a length from the wire before checking that many bytes are really there. A small malicious header can claim a huge length (on the order of a gigabyte).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
When decoding header blocks, the non-Huffman branch of `io.netty.handler.codec.http3.QpackDecoder#decodeHuffmanEncodedLiteral` may execute `new byte[length]` for a string literal before verifying that length bytes are actually present in the compressed field section. The wire encoding allows a very large length to be expressed in few bytes. There is no check that `length &amp;lt;= in.readableBytes()` before `new byte[length]`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The test below constructs a small HTTP/3 HEADERS frame whose QPACK section decodes to a ~1 GiB non-Huffman name length and is used to observe server-side failure; it illustrates how little wire data can target `new byte[length]`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
    @Test
    public void test() throws Exception {
        EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(1, NioIoHandler.newFactory());
        try {
            X509Bundle cert = new CertificateBuilder()
                    .subject(&amp;#34;cn=localhost&amp;#34;)
                    .setIsCertificateAuthority(true)
                    .buildSelfSigned();&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;QuicSslContext serverContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forServer(cert.toTempPrivateKeyPem(), null, cert.toTempCertChainPem())
                    .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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