https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 22:46:19 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-22871 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go standard library net/http/internal, Siemens SENTRON 7KT PAC1261 Data Manager</p> <p>The net/http package improperly accepts a bare LF as a line terminator in chunked data chunk-size lines. This can permit request smuggling if a net/http server is used in conjunction with a server that incorrectly accepts a bare LF as part of a chunk-ext.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go standard library net/http/internal, Siemens SENTRON 7KT PAC1261 Data Manager</p> <p>The net/http package improperly accepts a bare LF as a line terminator in chunked data chunk-size lines. This can permit request smuggling if a net/http server is used in conjunction with a server that incorrectly accepts a bare LF as part of a chunk-ext.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-22871 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: google.golang.org/grpc</p> <p>### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_</p> <p>It is an **Authorization Bypass** resulting from **Improper Input Validation** of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header.</p> <p>The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, &#34;deny&#34; rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback &#34;allow&#34; rule was present.</p> <p>**Who is impacted?** This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria: 1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`. 2. Their security policy contains specific &#34;deny&#34; rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback &#34;allow&#34; rule).</p> <p>The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server.</p> <p>### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_</p> <p>Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a `:path` that does…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: google.golang.org/grpc</p> <p>### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_</p> <p>It is an **Authorization Bypass** resulting from **Improper Input Validation** of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header.</p> <p>The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, &#34;deny&#34; rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback &#34;allow&#34; rule was present.</p> <p>**Who is impacted?** This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria: 1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`. 2. Their security policy contains specific &#34;deny&#34; rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback &#34;allow&#34; rule).</p> <p>The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server.</p> <p>### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_</p> <p>Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a `:path` that does…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3