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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-59920 — Netty: STOMP CONNECT Frame Header Injection</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-59920</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; netty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty&amp;#39;s STOMP encoder ( StompSubframeEncoder ) does not escape or validate header values in  CONNECT  and  CONNECTED  frames, so raw newline ( \n ) characters in a header value are written directly to the wire, allowing an attacker who controls a header value to inject additional STOMP headers. This happens because the encoder intentionally skips escaping for CONNECT/CONNECTED frames per the STOMP 1.2 specification but never rejects the raw newlines, and since a broker parses each line as a separate header, an attacker controlling a value such as a user-supplied login or passcode can overwrite connection parameters or add authentication/role headers to bypass authentication or escalate privileges (the actual impact is broker-dependent). The issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; netty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty&amp;#39;s STOMP encoder ( StompSubframeEncoder ) does not escape or validate header values in  CONNECT  and  CONNECTED  frames, so raw newline ( \n ) characters in a header value are written directly to the wire, allowing an attacker who controls a header value to inject additional STOMP headers. This happens because the encoder intentionally skips escaping for CONNECT/CONNECTED frames per the STOMP 1.2 specification but never rejects the raw newlines, and since a broker parses each line as a separate header, an attacker controlling a value such as a user-supplied login or passcode can overwrite connection parameters or add authentication/role headers to bypass authentication or escalate privileges (the actual impact is broker-dependent). The issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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